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ABSTRACT 
  Privacy is commonly studied as a private good: my personal data 
is mine to protect and control, and yours is yours. This conception of 
privacy misses an important component of the policy problem. An 
individual who is careless with data exposes not only extensive 
information about herself, but about others as well. The negative 
externalities imposed on nonconsenting outsiders by such carelessness 
can be productively studied in terms of welfare economics. If all 
relevant individuals maximize private benefit, and expect all other 
relevant individuals to do the same, neoclassical economic theory 
predicts that society will achieve a suboptimal level of privacy. This 
prediction holds even if all individuals cherish privacy with the same 
intensity. As the theoretical literature would have it, the struggle for 
privacy is destined to become a tragedy. 
  But according to the experimental public-goods literature, there is 
hope. Like in real life, people in experiments cooperate in groups at 
rates well above those predicted by neoclassical theory. Groups can 
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be aided in their struggle to produce public goods by institutions, such 
as communication, framing, or sanction. With these institutions, 
communities can manage public goods without heavy-handed 
government intervention. Legal scholarship has not fully engaged this 
problem in these terms. In this Article, we explain why privacy has 
aspects of a public good, and we draw lessons from both the 
theoretical and the empirical literature on public goods to inform the 
policy discourse on privacy. 
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We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang 
separately. 
 – Benjamin Franklin 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Your privacy is not yours alone. The data that a person produces 
concerns both herself and others.1 Being cautious with personal data 
is therefore not enough. Individuals are vulnerable merely because 
others have been careless with their data. As a result, privacy 
protection requires group coordination.2 Failure of coordination 
means a failure of privacy. In short, privacy is a public good. 
A public good is a social benefit that risks not being produced 
because everyone can share in it equally, whether they contribute to it 
or not.3 In the technical language of economics, a public good is a 
nonrival and nonexcludable resource.4 Such goods pose a social 
dilemma—although society is better off if the good is produced, it is 
against each individual’s best interest to expend resources 
contributing to the production of the good.5 Public goods run the 
gamut, from clean air to national defense.6 Consumption by one 
person does not affect consumption by another, and no one can be 
excluded from consuming.7 A public bad is the mathematical mirror 
 
 1. See Mark MacCarthy, New Directions in Privacy: Disclosure, Unfairness and 
Externalities, 6 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 425, 429 (2011) (“The idea is that disclosure 
of information by some people can reveal information about other people, to their detriment.”). 
 2. See Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1927 (2013) 
(“Privacy rights protect individuals, but to understand privacy simply as an individual right is a 
mistake. The ability to have, maintain, and manage privacy depends heavily on the attributes of 
one’s social, material, and informational environment.”). 
 3. See infra Part II.A; see also RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF 
EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 9 (2d ed. 1996) (laying out the general 
theory of public goods).  
 4. CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 3, at 9 (“The benefits of private goods are fully rival 
and excludable, whereas the benefits of pure public goods are nonrival and nonexcludable. 
From the foregoing examples, we see that food and fuel are private, whereas strategic weapons 
and pollution control are purely public goods.”). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 8–9. 
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image of a public good.8 A public bad imposes costs, not on any one 
person, but rather on everyone. Public bads, like polluted water or 
filthy air, are mathematically identical to public goods, with only the 
framing of the question differing—are we creating something from 
which we all benefit (clean air) or avoiding the creation of something 
that harms everyone (smog)?9 
An extensive behavioral-economics literature, much of it 
experimental, focuses on tools that groups can use to solve social 
dilemmas.10 Yet that literature has not yet addressed privacy as a 
public good.11 The legal literature on privacy suffers from a similar 
lacuna.12 Despite many theorists’ statements that privacy has an 
important social dimension,13 we have found no approach that mines 
the behavioral or experimental literature for group tools to resist the 
social dilemma of privacy. This Article fills that gap. 
By applying tools from behavioral and experimental economics 
to the still-intractable legal problem of privacy, we hope to shift the 
debate surrounding privacy protection. If the theories espoused here 
are correct, and we believe the science strongly shows they are, the 
 
 8. Bruce Yandle, Mixed Goods and Bads, 19 PUB. CHOICE 95, 95–96 (1974); Kenneth R. 
Richards, Framing Environmental Policy Instrument Choice, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 
221, 268 (2000). 
 9. See generally James Andreoni, Warm-Glow Versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive 
and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments, 110 Q. J. ECON. 1 (1995) (exploring how 
the framing of outcomes as public goods or bads affects participant choice). 
 10. This existing body of knowledge is summarized by John O. Ledyard, Public Goods: A 
Survey of Experimental Research, in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 111, 
141–69 (J.H. Kagel & A.E. Roth eds., Princeton 1995); Ananish Chaudhuri, Sustaining 
Cooperation in Laboratory Public Goods Experiments: A Selective Survey of the Literature, 14 
EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 47, 47–83 (2011); Jennifer Zelmer, Linear Public Goods Experiments: A 
Meta-Analysis, 6 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 299, 304–07 (2003). 
 11. See generally Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Public Goods, Social 
Pressure, and the Choice Between Privacy and Publicity, 2 AM. ECON. J. MICROECONOMICS 191 
(2010) (modeling a different situation in which contributing to a public good sends a signal 
about its type that would be individually profitable to keep confidential); Richard Posner, The 
Economics of Privacy, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 405 (1981) (comparing an individual’s demands for 
privacy with a seller’s demands to conceal product defects and theorizing that the protection of 
privacy is economically inefficient); Stefan Dodds, Privacy and Endogenous Monitoring Choice 
when Private Information is a Public Good (Queen’s Univ. Econ. Dep’t, Working Paper No. 
1010, 2002), http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/working_papers/papers/qed_wp_1010.pdf [http://
perma.cc/SVT9-ZXC2] (focusing on the opposite case where sharing the information is 
individually detrimental but socially beneficial). 
 12. See infra Parts I.C–D; see also MacCarthy, supra note 1, at 429 (“[T]here has not been 
sufficient attention paid to the idea that certain contexts of information disclosure and data 
analytics can reveal information about people other than the data subject.”). 
 13. See infra Part I.D. 
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manner in which law addresses privacy will and must undergo a sea 
change. Today’s social, legal, and self-regulatory tools focus on 
empowering individuals. They must equally be focused on 
empowering groups. 
Individual empowerment is not enough because an individual’s 
disclosure of information about herself impacts many other people. 
One source of risk is immediate and palpable—information about 
one person is also information about others.14 If a machine learning 
algorithm knows where someone is at a given time, it can predict 
where a spouse or friend is as well. Another source of risk is remote 
and concealed, but potentially even more dangerous. Big data 
companies collect large amounts of information about everyone.15 
They then mine this data for patterns.16 A single cue may facilitate an 
inference regarding information an individual has chosen not to 
reveal, or perhaps even something she did not know about herself. 
For instance, imagine paying higher insurance premiums because a 
sibling has cancer, or because a parent posts something about his 
heart disease, or a relative self-identifies as suffering from a particular 
mental illness.17 Alternatively, imagine not receiving a job offer 
because an algorithm has identified that the distance an employee 
lives from work strongly correlates with higher turnover.18 
The single-cue examples presented above are only the tip of the 
iceberg. The true power of big data rests on combining arrays of 
information.19 Consider Facebook, which recently applied for a patent 
 
 14. See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1939 
(2013) (“Big Data is notable not just because of the amount of personal information that can be 
processed, but because of the ways data in one area can be linked to other areas and produce 
new inferences and findings.”). 
 15. See MacCarthy, supra note 1, at 431 (“[T]he biggest dangers associated with online 
behavioral advertising might come from the possible secondary use of the profiles and analytics 
constructed to enable targeted advertising.”). 
 16. See Richards, supra note 14, at 1939 (“Big Data is fundamentally networked. Its value 
comes from the patterns that can be derived by making connections between pieces of data, 
about an individual, about individuals in relation to others, about groups of people, or simply 
about the structure of information itself.”); Jordan Ellenberg, What’s Even Creepier than Target 
Guessing that You’re Pregnant?, SLATE: HOW NOT TO BE WRONG (June 9, 2014), http://
www.slate.com/blogs/how_not_to_be_wrong/2014/06/09/big_data_what_s_even_creepier_than_
target_guessing_that_you_re_pregnant.html [http://perma.cc/E68S-UP4C]. 
 17. See MacCarthy, supra note 1, at 450 (“If a data collector knows the independent 
variable in that circumstance, it can use the regularity to infer the presence of the dependent 
variable, even when the people involved have not revealed the presence of that characteristic 
and it cannot be found in public records.”). 
 18. See id. at 450–51 (discussing how big data impacts eligibility decisions).  
 19. See Richards, supra note 14. 
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for inferring the creditworthiness of an individual based on the 
financial responsibility of the people in that individual’s social 
network.20 Each person’s financial decisions feed into the algorithm’s 
decisions about whether to extend others a loan.21 Moreover, the 
array of cues that might play into the determination of each 
individual’s financial responsibility (or any other attribute) can be 
vast and of varying precision. Sometimes a combination of cues is so 
tightly related to the unobserved information that it gives rise to a 
strong inference. For example, one study demonstrated that 87 
percent of the U.S. population can be uniquely identified just from 
zip code, gender, and date of birth.22 In some instances the inference 
might be wrong,23 but those relying on the cue pattern often do not 
care because they can afford to err on the side of caution.24 For 
example, an insurance company may prefer to lose a few customers 
rather than insure individuals whose relationships indicate a greater 
likelihood of expensive genetically linked illness. 
Individual control of data is a fundamentally flawed concept 
because individuals cannot know what the data they reveal means 
when aggregated with billions of other data points. For example, 
people who buy felt pads for their furniture are more likely to pay 
back loans because they are conscientious with their belongings; 
people who log into their credit-card accounts at 1:00 a.m. may be 
showing signs of financial anxiety; and people who use credit cards at 
drinking establishments are more likely to default on loans than 
people who use credit cards at the dentist.25 Big data firms learn these 
things by gathering colossal datasets from millions of people and 
 
 20. See Susie Cagle, Facebook Wants to Redline Your Friends List, PAC. STANDARD MAG. 
(Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.psmag.com/nature-and-technology/mo-friends-mo-problems-might-
have-to-defriend-joey-with-the-jet-ski-bankruptcy [http://perma.cc/TY87-MBBF]. 
 21. Id. (“In short: You could be denied a loan simply because your friends have defaulted 
on theirs. It’s the kind of digital redlining that critics of ‘big data’ collection have been warning 
of for years.”). 
 22. See LATANYA SWEENEY, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV., SCHOOL OF COMP. SCI., DATA 
PRIVACY LAB., RE-IDENTIFICATION OF DE-IDENTIFIED SURVEY DATA (2000). 
 23. See Tim Harford, Big Data: Are We Making a Big Mistake?, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2014), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/21a6e7d8-b479-11e3-a09a-00144feabdc0.html [http://perma.cc/HMR8-
WHPD] (detailing the problem of attributing cause to highly correlated data points in found 
datasets).  
 24. See MacCarthy, supra note 1, at 455 (“These indirect disclosures are usually 
probabilistic rather than certain.”).  
 25. Charles Duhigg, What Does Your Credit Card Company Know About You?, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. (May 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/magazine/17credit-t.html?page
wanted=all&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/E2W2-VPY8].  
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mining the resulting pools of information. No matter how healthy or 
creditworthy or committed to work a person may be, he might not 
receive a home loan, job offer, or affordable insurance, because of 
correlations ascertained from others’ data. 
If you believe in the effectiveness of incentivizing, informing, and 
empowering individual citizens to protect their own privacy, this is 
very bad news. As long as the immediate benefit from disclosing your 
data exceeds the ensuing long-term risk for your own privacy, you will 
give away your data. This prediction holds even if all individuals 
cherish privacy with the same intensity. If neoclassical economic 
theory is correct, the struggle for privacy is destined to become a 
tragedy.26 
But all hope is not lost. Both in the field and under the tightly 
controlled conditions of a lab, groups have effectively produced 
public goods.27 The tragedy can be overcome. Good will alone, 
however, is not enough. Instead, group rules or structural conditions 
(called “institutions”) must trigger and channel contributors’ sense of 
altruism and equity.28 This works even better if an institution actively 
foments cooperation.29 Luckily, privacy is by no means the only public 
good. Clean air, safety, roads, and the common defense all share the 
same incentive structure.30 Privacy policy thus need not reinvent the 
 
 26. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) 
(theorizing that when given a choice, individuals will act in a way that is beneficial to 
themselves, even though the collective actions of all such individuals will be detrimental both to 
themselves and society as a whole). For an application to privacy and information, see Dennis 
D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What Privacy Regulation Can Learn from 
Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1, 10 (2006) [hereinafter Hirsch, Inner Environment] 
(“Privacy injuries, much like environmental damage, accordingly qualify as ‘negative 
externalities.’ If left unchecked, these privacy-infringing industries will ultimately destroy the 
very resources on which they themselves depend. This will generate the same kind of ‘tragedy of 
the commons’ that environmental laws were designed to alleviate.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Ledyard, supra note 10, at 121 (noting that people do make contributions to 
the public good, that “[f]ace to face communication improves the rate of contribution,” and that 
“the public goods problem is not as bad as some economists make it out to be”).  
 28. See Andreoni, supra note 9, at 13 (“[C]ooperation in public goods experiments cannot 
be explained by pure altruism that subjects may have for each other. . . . Instead there must be 
some asymmetry in the way people feel personally about doing good for others versus not doing 
bad: the warm-glow must be stronger than the cold-prickle.”). 
 29. See, e.g., James Andreoni & Larry Samuelson, Building Rational Cooperation, 127 J. 
ECON. THEORY 117, 122 (2006) (“A player thus prefers that his opponent cooperate, and finds 
cooperation relatively more attractive the more likely is the opponent to cooperate.”). 
 30. See, e.g., CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 3, at 517 (“The selling price differential 
between two houses whose characteristics are the same except for air quality provides a 
measure for the private willingness to pay for the public good of clean air.”); Paul M. Schwartz, 
Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2084–85 (2004) [hereinafter 
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wheel; it can benefit from solutions developed and tested in these 
areas. From this perspective, privacy is no longer a tragedy, but it 
remains a drama, calling for vigilance and, ideally, intervention in the 
form of group-empowering institutions that enable sustained 
cooperation in the face of a social dilemma.31 
Inattention to privacy’s public-good nature has led privacy policy 
astray.32 In the absence of public-policy attention to privacy’s group 
dimension, individual consumers have been left to negotiate, 
unsuccessfully, with companies over the use of their data. Private 
companies have accumulated deep and potentially toxic pools of 
consumer data, and have made this data available to governments 
with few legal safeguards.33 Social-media networks have become the 
business end of dragnet surveillance.34 The transition to mobile 
computing and its attendant geolocation data exacerbates the 
problem.35 Systems designed to use geolocation to deliver 
 
Schwartz, Property] (“From this perspective, information privacy functions as a type of public 
good, like clean air or national defense.”). 
 31. See COMM. ON THE HUMAN DIMENSIONS OF GLOBAL CHANGE, NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS (Elinor Ostrom et al. eds., National Academy Press 
2002) [hereinafter DRAMA]. 
 32. See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the 
Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 266–69 (2011). 
 33. See Tom Hamburger, Privacy Rights Need Urgent Protection in Washington, Activists 
Say, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/consumer-privacy-
rights-need-urgent-protection-in-washington-activists-say/2014/02/24/1764ba22-9cb7-11e3-975d-
107dfef7b668_story.html [http://perma.cc/QG8M-W3JV] (“Privacy protection demands have 
increased in recent months as data-collection companies face new pressure from European 
regulators alarmed by disclosure of U.S. government spying.”); Bruce Schneier, The Tech Lab: 
Bruce Schneier, BBC (Feb. 26, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7897892.stm [http://
perma.cc/FJA8-GBVA] (“Data is the pollution of the information age. It’s a natural by-product 
of every computer-mediated interaction. It stays around forever, unless it’s disposed of. It is 
valuable when reused, but it must be done carefully. Otherwise, its after-effects are toxic. And 
just as 100 years ago people ignored pollution in our rush to build the Industrial Age, today 
we’re ignoring data in our rush to build the Information Age.”). 
 34. See Bruce Schneier, Don’t Listen to Google and Facebook: The Public-Private 
Surveillance Partnership is Still Going Strong, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 25, 2014, 11:08 AM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/03/don-t-listen-to-google-and-facebook-
the-public-private-surveillance-partnership-is-still-going-strong/284612 [http://perma.cc/M8PE-
ZBCJ] (“Google, and by extension, the U.S. government, still has access to your 
communications on Google’s servers.”). 
 35. See Brian Fung, Verizon Transparency Report Reveals 320,000 Data Requests in 2013, 
WASH. POST: THE SWITCH (Jan. 22, 2014, 12:17 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
switch/wp/2014/01/22/verizon-transparency-report-reveals-320000-data-requests-in-2013 [http://
perma.cc/YRZ4-ENG4]. 
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advertisements to mobile devices serve as tools of political 
oppression.36 
Policymakers must change tack to effectively moderate this 
trend. Well-meaning legislators, judges, and regulators have focused 
almost exclusively on two elements: individual consumer 
comprehension (notice), and individualized control (choice).37 We 
support these efforts, but believe that other approaches offer greater 
value, in particular approaches that arm groups against social 
dilemmas. 
This Article starts that conversation and provides some framing 
principles to promote collective action on privacy. We take seriously 
the as-yet unanswered call for more extensive study of privacy as a 
public good.38 We further think that the behavioral-economics 
literature—which asks how people actually behave in these 
situations—draws a clearer picture than the excessively rigorous pure-
theory public goods of neoclassical economics.39 
In neoclassical economics, a dilemma results from a difference 
between individual and social benefit.40 The individual is best off if 
 
 36. See Andrew E. Kramer, Ukraine’s Opposition Says Government Stirs Violence, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/22/world/europe/ukraine-protests.html 
[http://perma.cc/D2VJ-364C] (detailing the use of cell phone site location technology to deliver 
threats to protesters). 
 37. See Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Plan to Protect Privacy in the Internet 
Age by Adopting a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights (Feb. 23, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2012/02/23/fact-sheet-plan-protect-privacy-internet-age-adopting-consumer-
privacy-b [https://perma.cc/83CJ-JZLV]; Jennifer Martinez, Markey Introduces Mobile Privacy 
Bill, THE HILL (Sept. 12, 2012, 5:46 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/249055-markey-
introduces-mobile-privacy-bill [http://perma.cc/JG4Y-MNKJ]; Somini Sengupta, Web Privacy 
Becomes a Business Imperative, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/04/
technology/amid-do-not-track-effort-web-companies-race-to-look-privacy-friendly.html?page
wanted=all [http://perma.cc/N7GH-3HDP] (“Privacy is no longer just a regulatory headache. 
Increasingly, Internet companies are pushing each other to prove to consumers that their data is 
safe and in their control.”). 
 38. See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 228, 231 (1995) (“Recognition that privacy has some features of a public or 
collective good would make clearer the institutional or organizational interests in personal 
information and the weaknesses of a market solution in providing privacy protection.”). 
 39. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473 (1998) (suggesting incorporating behavioral 
economics into law and economics and noting that “[t]he absence of sustained and 
comprehensive economic analysis of legal rules from a perspective informed by insights about 
actual human behavior makes for a significant contrast with many other fields of economics, 
where such ‘behavioral’ analysis has become relatively common”). 
 40. See Richard Warner & Robert H. Sloan, Behavioral Advertising: From One-Sided 
Chicken to Informational Norms, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 49, 55 (2012) (“Collective action 
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she ignores the negative or positive effects that her action entails for 
others.41 This holds even if the individual foresees that all other 
relevant outsiders will behave the same way.42 She then foresees that 
she will suffer severely from others’ inflicting harm on her, or 
withholding socially desirable behavior.43 Even so, if she is the only 
one to take the ramifications of her actions on others into account, 
she will be even worse off. Others would suffer a little less, or they 
would gain a little, but she would experience less benefit than all 
other selfish individuals would enjoy collectively.44 If she expects all 
others to be selfish, she has no incentive to consider the common 
good herself.45 
The neoclassical literature therefore supposes that individually 
informed and empowered actors will act against group social 
welfare.46 But experimental literature shows repeatedly that the 
neoclassical picture is too pessimistic. A rich literature47 has tested 
and rejected the theoretical prediction that groups will completely fail 
to produce public goods.48 
 
problems are situations in which everyone is worse off if everyone does what he individually 
prefers to do.”).  
 41. Id. 
 42. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral 
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1765–66 (2001) (discussing how 
trustworthy people expect others to also be trustworthy, and vice versa).  
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. at 1751 (noting that the neoclassical model is one of “human behavior driven by 
rational self-interest”); Jennifer L. Radner, Phone, Fax, and Frustration: Electronic Commercial 
Speech and Nuisance Law, 42 EMORY L.J. 359, 404–05 (1993) (“Further, the [neoclassical] 
model assumes that individuals are able to accurately judge their own welfare and that their 
decisions will not be dependent upon the welfare of others.”); see generally CORNES & 
SANDLER, supra note 3 (presenting a theoretical framework of externalities); TODD SANDLER, 
GLOBAL COLLECTIVE ACTION (2004) (analyzing factors that affect the success or failure of 
collective action); TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATION (1992) 
(providing a summary of collective-action research); Hardin, supra note 26 (introducing 
Hardin’s well-known theory). 
 47. Surveys are provided by Chaudhuri, supra note 10, at 56–59; Ledyard, supra note 10, at 
111; and Zelmer, supra note 10, at 304–08.  
 48. See, e.g., Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, Long Term Competition—A Game 
Theoretic Analysis, in COLLECTED PAPERS: R.J. AUMANN 395, 396 (1992) (concluding that 
“individual self-interest in [certain] situations can in fact dictate a kind of cooperative 
behavior”); David M. Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts & Robert Wilson, Rational 
Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 245, 245–52 
(1982) (presenting “how reputation effects due to informational asymmetries can generate 
cooperative behavior in finitely repeated versions of the classic prisoners’ dilemma”); Reinhard 
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When humans enter the lab, they resist public-goods problems 
and attempt to cooperate at rates well above that which theory would 
predict.49 They struggle.50 Often, given the math of the experiments, 
they are doomed to ultimate failure, but they struggle nonetheless. 
Different features of the collective-action environment mean that 
their struggles have more or less success.51 Following Nobel Prize 
winner Elinor Ostrom, we term this struggle the drama of the 
commons.52 If game theory were entirely correct, a community facing 
a problem that has the properties of a public good would be doomed 
to tragedy. The community would suffer maximum damage. Luckily 
both in the lab53 and in the field this prediction is too gloomy.54 Some 
communities in some contexts have found viable and sustainable ways 
to overcome the dilemma. 
Consequently, groups must be given tools to create the public 
good of privacy and resist the public bad of readily available intrusive 
information (which one might call “data pollution”). Informing and 
empowering individual players does not resolve a social dilemma. It is 
precisely the fully informed, rational, and empowered individual who 
knows she is better off contributing fully to a public bad, and free 
riding on a public good, regardless of the actions of others.55 The 
relevant legal tools therefore should be redesigned to focus less on 
 
Selten, The Chain Store Paradox, 9 THEORY & DECISION 127, 127–59 (1978) (presenting three 
levels of individual decisionmaking that help to refute basic game-theory assumptions). 
 49. See Blair & Stout, supra note 42, at 1761 (“[I]ndividuals in social dilemma experiments 
exhibit far more cooperative behavior than can possibly be explained by external incentives.”). 
 50. See id. at 1761–62 (noting that individuals essentially show two personalities in 
experimental social-dilemma contexts, and “[w]hen the competitive personality is dominant, an 
individual will choose options that maximize her personal payoffs without regard for effects on 
others . . . [and w]hen the cooperative personality governs, an individual will choose options that 
maximize group welfare over options that maximize her own”). 
 51. See id. at 1768 (“[A] . . . key empirical finding from the social dilemma studies is that 
even high trusters, in the right circumstances, predictably choose to defect rather than 
cooperate. The key appears to be whether, when faced with a new situation that presents social 
dilemma payoffs, an individual categorizes it as a competitive task or a cooperative task.”). 
 52. See DRAMA, supra note 31, at 4. 
 53. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. 
 54. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 1 (1990) (“[C]ommunities of individuals have relied 
on institutions resembling neither the state nor the market to govern some resource systems 
with reasonable degrees of success over long periods of time.”). 
 55. See Robyn M. Dawes & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Cooperation, 1988 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 187, 196 (“Perhaps we need to give more attention to ‘sensible cooperators.’”). 
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individual knowledge and empowerment and more on facilitating 
groups’ collective protection of their privacy.56  
This Article mines the behavioral-economics literature to find 
new approaches to privacy protection that permit groups to sustain 
cooperation and protect privacy even without direct government 
intervention. We suggest a focus on empowering groups. We suggest 
leveraging inequity aversion, reciprocity, and normativity to lessen 
exploitation among group members.57 We suggest positive framing to 
promote altruism.58 We suggest that communication and (private) 
sanctions are key components of group coordination.59 With these 
tools, groups may be able to sustain privacy without governmental 
intervention and the challenges and distortions that flow therefrom.60 
The balance of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains 
the gap in law and policy by describing first how data mining can 
cause one person’s data to negatively impact others before analyzing 
why privacy theory has had trouble proposing ways to contain these 
harms. Part II lays out the case for treating privacy as a public good as 
strictly defined in the economics literature, and Part III describes 
methods and tools drawn from the behavioral and theoretical 
literature that will empower groups to collectively protect privacy. 
I.  THE GAP IN LAW AND POLICY 
Just about every middle schooler understands that a fundamental 
problem of privacy online is not what one says about oneself, but 
what others say.61 Big data exacerbates this problem beyond gossip 
and thoughtless comments. Big data allows users to reveal critical 
 
 56. Cf. Cohen, supra note 2, at 1927. 
 57. See David A. Dana, Adequacy of Representation After Stephenson: A 
Rawlsian/Behavioral Economics Approach to Class Action Settlements, 55 EMORY L.J. 279, 303 
(2006) (noting the influence of inequality aversion on class-action settlements). 
 58. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2463, 2512 (2004) (“Options that are packaged as gains (for example, ‘lives saved’) induce risk 
aversion; when the very same choices are packaged as losses (‘lives lost’), they induce risk 
taking because of loss aversion.”). 
 59. See Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game 
Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 218 (2009) (noting that law serves as a mechanism for 
cooperation and coordination). 
 60. See id.; Blair & Stout, supra note 42, at 1771 (“[A]llowing the players to communicate 
with each other in a social dilemma significantly increases the incidence of cooperation.”). 
 61. See Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1892 (2013) [hereinafter Solove, Introduction] (“Additionally, privacy 
self-management fails to account for the social impacts of individual privacy decisions.”). 
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information about other people without understanding they are doing 
so.62 Even by revealing personal interests and disinterests, users train 
machine-learning algorithms to predict the behavior of other people, 
forming the basis for targeted behavioral advertising,63 and creating 
the potential for abuse by other interested actors. 
This Part explores the need for policymakers to fully engage with 
privacy as a public good. Our specific goals in this Part are to 
underscore the importance of treating privacy as a social dilemma by 
showing how the data we share about one another can form toxic 
pools; to discuss privacy theory’s overinvestment in individual-
centered theories of privacy; to demonstrate the resulting lacuna in 
the legal literature on the subject of privacy as a public good as 
strictly defined by the economics literature; and thus to establish the 
necessity of our contribution: mining the behavioral- and empirical-
economics literature for tools to arm groups against the social 
dilemma of privacy. 
A. Limitations on Scope 
Privacy theory has long attempted to define privacy in terms of 
its core or constitutive elements.64 We do not take this approach. 
Rather than seeking to define privacy, we seek to provide tools that 
help groups minimize the damage caused by information-based social 
dilemmas. Our approach is consistent with most definitions of 
privacy, because we suggest not a definition, but a set of institutional 
features that permit groups to sustain cooperation. Our agnosticism 
as to any single definition of privacy necessarily colors our approach 
 
 62. See Terence J. Lau, Towards Zero Net Presence, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 237, 244 (2011) (“Most users do not realize, however, that the information they post on 
social media websites can sometimes yield unintended consequences.”); MacCarthy, supra note 
1, at 448 (“[A]n individual’s decision to share information with a data collector imposes costs on 
other individuals. . . . [T]here is leakage of information about individuals who do not themselves 
choose to reveal it.”); Richards, supra note 14, at 1939; Solove, Introduction, supra note 61, at 
1881 (“It is virtually impossible for people to weigh the costs and benefits of revealing 
information or permitting its use or transfer without an understanding of the potential 
downstream uses, further limiting the effectiveness of the privacy self-management 
framework.”). 
 63. See, e.g., Riva Richmond, As ‘Like’ Buttons Spread, So Do Facebook’s Tentacles, N.Y. 
TIMES: BITS (Sept. 27, 2011, 3:51 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/27/as-like-buttons-
spread-so-do-facebooks-tentacles/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/T7DT-TY
7C]. 
 64. See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1099–1123 
(2002) [hereinafter Solove, Privacy] (gathering and challenging essentialist conceptions of 
privacy). 
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to the legal literature that attempts to define privacy. We find these 
attempts to capture the essence of privacy in a definition interesting, 
but ultimately orthogonal to our approach. We instead offer an 
approach that may permit groups to protect what they consider to be 
private at significantly lower cost, and with reduced need for 
government intervention. The goal is to kick off future debate about 
the value of continuing with an individual-focused approach to 
privacy protection. The practical result of this limitation in scope is 
that we do not believe that adherence to any particular school of 
thought regarding what privacy is (with the narrow exception of some 
elements of privacy as individualized control, to which we return 
below) detracts from the approach advanced here. 
A second caveat: information produces both positive and 
negative network effects, and both positive and negative 
externalities.65 This Article takes no position on the upside of 
information gathering, or on whether the gains from information 
gathering outweigh the privacy losses. To us, it does not matter: 
minimizing privacy costs associated with data accumulation is one 
way to maximize the net gains or reduce the net losses. To provide an 
example, suppose the government (or Apple, or Google) gathered 
everyone’s healthcare data and parsed it with big data tools. Some 
people would suffer adverse healthcare decisions (for example, 
insurance-premium raises, inadequate coverage, and high 
deductibles) based on this data. Others would benefit from cures we 
might be able to tease from the mass of correlations. Both can be 
simultaneously true. Our approach seeks to minimize the downside of 
this function, not to argue the upside does not exist. 
In some situations, individuals will evaluate the same degree of 
information revelation differently. For example, if I have already 
been diagnosed with a socially stigmatized illness and am in the 
hospital, I may not be particularly concerned about this information 
being used by some online platform. Possibly, all I care about is 
medicine advancing fast enough to prolong my life. By contrast, 
others may have a very strong interest in keeping the same piece of 
information confidential since they fear losing their jobs. Defining the 
optimal solution for such conflicts resulting from deep heterogeneity 
is beyond the scope of this Article. Given that privacy as a public 
 
 65. See Jane R. Bambauer, The New Intrusion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 205, 227 (2012) 
(“[P]rivacy losses are the negative externalities from an otherwise productive and worthwhile 
activity—information flow.”). 
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good is not on the scholarly or policymaking radar, we deem it 
important to first explain why this perspective is often appropriate. 
We leave it to future work to explore the qualification resulting from 
deep heterogeneity. 
B. Toxic Data Accumulation 
Central to our thesis is the idea that large pools of data 
accumulated over time and from many different sources can exert a 
corrosive effect on social welfare.66 Two salient features of 
accumulated data make it potentially toxic. The first is that data 
accumulates across time. Humans do not remember contributing the 
information and do not take precautions against misuse. The second 
feature is that data accumulates across sources. Again, humans do not 
adequately account for the fact that what they tell one counterparty 
will be communicated many times to many others. In both senses, the 
accumulated data is experienced as toxic: it can harm people in ways 
they did not foresee. 
Because of these effects, security expert Bruce Schneier has 
called data “the pollution of the information age.”67 Stale data can 
cause damage because of its privacy impact. For example, assume that 
because of a youthful indiscretion, an individual received a drug 
conviction, for which she paid a penalty, or suppose that she had 
engaged in political protests that create a risk of employer backlash. 
Decades ago, she could have moved on with her life with confidence 
that her prior conduct would not come back to haunt her, because the 
information was not concatenated with other datasets or stored in 
easily searchable fashion. Now, a conviction results in exclusion from 
the economy because the information is permanently recorded and 
spreads into background-check databases. Stale data damages 
citizens’ ability to reinvent themselves; it increases the risk of identity 
theft; it increases price discrimination;68 and, through filter bubbling 
(the practice of limiting search results based on the searching party’s 
data profile),69 it decreases the ability of citizens to make informed 
 
 66. See id. 
 67. See Schneier, supra note 33. 
 68. See ANNA BERNASEK & D.T. MONGAN, ALL YOU CAN PAY: HOW COMPANIES USE 
OUR DATA TO EMPTY OUR WALLETS 17–20 (2015). 
 69. See generally ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT THE INTERNET IS HIDING 
FROM YOU (2011) (detailing how technology firms influence citizens by limiting search 
information to personalized results).  
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choices drawn from a range of data sources, among a number of other 
potential effects. 
We take Schneier’s intuition one step further. We ask why 
groups of people remain willing to continue pouring data into those 
pools. One stock response, which we find unconvincing, is that people 
do not care about privacy.70 The answer we advance here instead is 
that groups and individuals have different incentives. This answer is 
particularly elegant: public-goods theory explains why everyone 
might deeply cherish privacy, yet still contribute to privacy-damaging 
stores of data, just as everyone likes clean air, but individuals still 
pollute. 
The truth of Schneier’s suggestion has been repeatedly 
demonstrated in the field. In 2006, AOL Inc. (AOL) released twenty 
million search queries to researchers.71 Privacy organizations termed 
this event a “data Valdez,” a reference to the oil spill caused by a run-
aground tanker off the Alaskan coast.72 Yet just as the original Valdez 
spill now appears tiny compared to subsequent breaches such as the 
British Petroleum spill, so subsequent data breaches have made 
AOL’s search leak seem miniscule in comparison.73 The leaks have 
grown in size and potential financial damage. Malware residing on 
Home Depot cash registers captured the credit information of fifty-six 
million card holders in September 2014.74 Another hack involved 160 
million credit-card and debit-card numbers, stolen over a seven-year 
 
 70. See, e.g., Greg Satell, Let’s Face It, We Don’t Really Care About Privacy, FORBES 
(Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregsatell/2014/12/01/lets-face-it-we-dont-really-
care-about-privacy [http://perma.cc/R27Y-6485] (characterizing a Pew survey indicating that 91 
percent of Americans feel “that consumers have lost control over how personal information is 
collected and used by companies” as evidence that although Americans are aware of personal 
monitoring, they do not do enough to stop it).  
 71. Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller, Jr., A Face is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html?page
wanted=all [http://perma.cc/N4UB-X782]. 
 72. See, e.g., Derek Slater, AOL’s Data Valdez Violates Users’ Privacy, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Aug. 7, 2006), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2006/08/aols-data-valdez-violates-users-
privacy [http://perma.cc/5LE2-AVCF].  
 73. See, e.g., Brian Fung, The Target Hack Gets Worse: Phone Numbers, Addresses of Up to 
70 Million Customers Leaked, WASH. POST: THE SWITCH (Jan. 10, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/01/10/the-target-hack-gets-worse-
phone-numbers-addresses-of-up-to-70-million-customers-leaked [http://perma.cc/6ER4-3XLA] 
(documenting the data breach of Target, compromising the data of 70 million people). 
 74. See Jim Finkle & Nandita Bose, Home Depot Breach Bigger than Target at 56 Million 
Cards, REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2014, 7:16 PM), http://www.reuters.com/ article/2014/09/18/us-home-
depot-dataprotection-idUSKBN0HD2J420140918 [http://perma.cc/6FBX-PDWX]. 
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period.75 Hacks of tens of millions of cards from major retailers came 
to light during the 2013 holiday season.76 These hacks were 
augmented by the theft of non-credit-card private information 
gathered from seventy million customers, including names, addresses, 
email addresses, and phone numbers.77 The U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management suffered a serious hack in which the personal data of 
over twenty million people was compromised.78 Hacks are increasing 
in frequency and impact because the pools of data stored by 
companies continue to grow.79 Because more data can be 
compromised in a single leak, hackers have a greater incentive to 
instigate such a leak. As a result, merely accumulating data in 
connection with regular e-commerce creates a toxic buildup of 
incentives to steal and misuse that data. 
Consumer-credit hacks are just the tip of the iceberg. Social 
media provides rich troves for data researchers.80 Users disclose data 
about shops they visit, trips they take, routes they drive, food they 
eat, and increasingly people they encounter.81 Users tag photographs 
of one another on Facebook.82 Users reference one another in 
geolocated social-media posts. They comment on one another’s 
 
 75. Daniel Beekman, Hackers Hit Companies Like Nasdaq, 7-Eleven for $300 Million, 
Prosecutors Say, NY DAILY NEWS (July 26, 2013, 12:41 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/
national/russians-ukrainian-charged-largest-hacking-spree-u-s-history-article-1.1408948 [http://
perma.cc/3GM5-Y88K]. 
 76. See Gregory Wallace, Target and Neiman Marcus Hacks: The Latest, CNN MONEY 
(Jan. 13, 2014, 12:35 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/01/13/news/target-neiman-marcus-hack 
[http://perma.cc/LU8J-FQ2X]. 
 77. See id.  
 78. See David Jackson & Kevin Johnson, China Suspected in Massive U.S. Government 
Data Breach, USA TODAY (June 5, 2015, 12:42 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2015/06/04/obama-office-of-personnel-management-data-breach/28495775 [http://perma.
cc/H2DQ-MGSZ] (noting that the recent data theft from the Office of Personnel Management 
computer systems compromised sensitive personal information, including Social Security 
numbers, credit-card data, and other forms of financial information of roughly 21.5 million 
people from both inside and outside the government). 
 79. See Martin Hilbert & Priscila López, The World’s Technological Capacity to Store, 
Communicate, and Compute Information, 332 SCIENCE 60, 63–64 (2011) (detailing geometric 
increase in worldwide data-storage capacity). 
 80. See Michael Birnhack, Reverse Engineering Informational Privacy Law, 15 YALE J.L. & 
TECH. 24, 85 (2013) (“[N]ew network applications, especially social networks, enable (or 
perhaps push) users to share personal data.”). 
 81. See id. at 86. 
 82. See James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1145–46 (2009) 
(“There’s a photo-sharing feature, imaginatively names ‘Photos,’ with a clever tagging system: 
click on a face in a photo—even one posted by someone else—and you can enter the person’s 
name.”). 
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walls.83 They take photographs of one another with Snapchat, and 
post commented pictures to Instagram.84 Consumers do this in the 
mistaken belief that data is ephemeral, or because of too-often-
broken promises that consumer data can be kept safe from other 
consumers or malicious third parties.85 
Ubiquitous smartphones permit users to contribute data about 
themselves and others on a constant basis.86 People have fewer places 
to hide from social-media-enabled computing because others carry it 
with them.87 There are vanishingly few modern social situations in 
which no one in the room is carrying a GPS-embedded or voice-
activated device. Engaging with social media is therefore not an 
individual choice. It is an inevitable outcome of being in almost any 
social situation. Location information is a particularly powerful 
example of how one person’s data can affect others. Cell phones track 
individuals’ location precisely, and by proxy, the locations of others.88 
 
 83. See Jason Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1643, 1653 (2012) 
(“Facebook users do not necessarily want those responses and comments associated with their 
own individual accounts, and therefore themselves, to be publicly accessible.”).  
 84. See Nick Bilton, Disruptions: Indiscreet Photos, Glimpsed Then Gone, N.Y. TIMES: 
BITS (May 6, 2012, 5:24 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/disruptions-indiscreet-
photos-glimpsed-then-gone [https://perma.cc/4NS8-9YGK]; Josh Constine, Instagram Now Lets 
Anyone Tag You [Or Brands] In Photos, Adds Them To “Photos of You” Profile Section, 
TECHCRUNCH (May 2, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/05/02/instagram-photo-tagging [http://
perma.cc/7FR7-SLJE]. 
 85. See Catherine Shu, Confirmed: Snapchat Hack Not A Hoax, 4.6M Usernames And 
Numbers Published, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 31, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/12/31/hackers-
claim-to-publish-list-of-4-6m-snapchat-usernames-and-numbers [http://perma.cc/H3GR-59VH] 
(noting that two data breaches at Snapchat “are both reminders that even in an ephemeral 
messaging service, it would be a mistake to be lulled into a sense of security about the 
information that you do have stored with the app”); see also Press Release, Federal Trade 
Commission, Snapchat Settles FTC Charges That Promises of Disappearing Messages Were 
False (May 18, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/05/snapchat-settles-
ftc-charges-promises-disappearing-messages-were [https://perma.cc/2FS4-TJDA]. 
 86. See Thomas H. Chia, Fighting the Smartphone Patent War with Rand-Encumbered 
Patents, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 209, 231 (2012) (discussing how smartphone operating 
systems’ data collection can lead to increased probability of a monopoly). 
 87. See Peter Swire, Social Networks, Privacy, and Freedom of Association: Data Protection 
vs. Data Empowerment, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1371, 1381–82 (2012) (noting that privacy is once again 
a salient issue given, in part, both the “rise of social networks” and the “skyrocketing use of 
mobile devices”).  
 88. See Lau, supra note 62, at 245 (noting the existence of “a new generation of social 
networking built upon wireless platforms with Global Position System (GPS) technology”); see 
also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-903, MOBILE DEVICE LOCATION DATA: 
ADDITIONAL FEDERAL ACTIONS COULD HELP PROTECT CONSUMER PRIVACY 11–13 (2012) 
(noting that “[s]ince the advent of consumer cellular technology, making and receiving mobile 
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Knowledge of where one person is, augmented by knowledge of that 
person’s social network, can help to identify and locate those who are 
regularly in proximity to that person.89 
Users have accepted a far more invasive set of end-use license 
conditions governing their use of smartphones than they have for 
desktops and laptops.90 These smartphone contracts are understood 
and construed as agreements purely between the consumer and the 
carrier, operating-system designer, manufacturer, or application 
provider. Data disclosed under these agreements impacts third parties 
who have no say. Users’ contact lists and personal calendars are 
regularly scraped by mobile applications.91 Users’ email conversations 
with nonconsenting third parties are parsed by their email services.92 
Carriers hide keystroke-logging software on cell phones, and append 
tracking IDs to outgoing connections, so that consumers are 
comprehensively tracked without their knowledge.93 Browsing activity 
can then be combined with geolocation and social-media mapping to 
 
telephone calls has depended on the ability to determine a device’s location” and that new 
location-tracking technologies have made it easier to track location).  
 89. See James Risen & Laura Poitras, NSA Gathers Data on Social Connections of U.S. 
Citizens, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/nsa-examines-soc
ial-networks-of-us-citizens.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/B7SP-TS2F] (discussing 
the National Security Agency’s use of social connections to track a target’s locations, 
relationships, and other personal data). 
 90. See Lau, supra note 62, at 251–52 (“As a customer uses [Google’s G1 phone], data such 
as the user’s name, contacts, instant messages, emails, calendars, social networking site visits, 
and videos downloaded are all collected. The user cannot see what specific data is collected, and 
there is no way to expunge the data.”). 
 91. See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Fowler, Secrets You Share Online Aren’t Always So Secret, WALL 
ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2014, 7:54 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303880604579405
020639967010 [http://perma.cc/WQ3Z-PVBF] (describing secret-posting apps that “peddle 
anonymity, [but] collect enough information to build profiles about each user,” for instance by 
“tapping . . . location and contacts to share [postings] anonymously with [existing contacts]”).  
 92. See Eben Moglen, Address at Columbia Law School, Snowden and the Future: Part III; 
The Union, May It Be Preserved (Nov. 13, 2013), http://snowdenandthefuture.info/snowdenand
thefuture-unionpreserved.pdf [http://perma.cc/3TEN-EUZL].  
 93. See Andrew D. Salek-Raham, Carrier IQ, Pre-Transit Keystroke Logging, and the 
Federal Wiretap Act, 13 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 417, 426 (2012) (describing use of “embedded 
handset software that automatically provides real-time data . . . without requiring user 
participation or knowledge”); Robert McMillan, Verizon’s Perma-Cookie is a Privacy Killing 
Machine, WIRED (Oct. 27, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/10/verizons-perma-
cookie [http://perma.cc/T8PD-3DF6] (describing Verizon’s process of appending a UIDH to 
customers’ web traffic). 
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provide a total profile of the user, her social network, her real-world 
location, and her interactions with others.94 
This concatenation of data is immensely valuable to advertisers 
and has proven an irresistible temptation to government.95 One harm 
stemming from toxic data is that citizens’ speech may be chilled due 
to this hybrid corporate-government dragnet surveillance.96 Even 
after the reforms of the USA Freedom Act,97 call data from most 
telephone calls in the United States is gathered by carriers and stored 
for access by the National Security Agency (NSA) under rolling 
orders from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).98 
Under current law, nothing prevents Internet service providers 
(ISPs), mobile manufacturers, and the NSA from doing the same with 
web-traffic or geolocation data (although now the NSA might now 
not hold some data directly).99 The NSA denies such surveillance of 
web queries and geolocation information, but recent revelations 
demonstrate that it has the technology, has used or experimented 
with such programs in the past, and has the go-ahead from the FISC, 
 
 94. See G.S. Hans, Privacy Policies, Terms of Service, and FTC Enforcement: Broadening 
Unfairness Regulation for A New Era, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 163, 164 (2012) 
(describing the routine collection and sale of user data collected by various websites). 
 95. See id. (describing the broad market for Internet user data among advertisers and other 
third parties); Richards, supra note 14, at 1958 (“One of the most significant changes that the 
age of surveillance has brought about is the increasing difficulty of separating surveillance by 
governments from that of commercial entities. Public- and private-sector surveillance are 
intertwined . . . [as] their digital fruits can easily cross the public/private divide.”). 
 96. See Scott Michelman, Who Can Sue over Government Surveillance?, 57 UCLA L. REV. 
71, 78 (2009) (“People who believe that they are being surveilled might avoid . . . expressing 
opinions that could subject them to further investigation.”). 
 97. See USA Freedom Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (restoring in modified 
form several provisions of the Patriot Act, the Freedom Act imposes new limits on the bulk 
collection of telecommunication metadata on U.S. citizens by American intelligence agencies, 
including the National Security Agency). 
 98. See Timothy B. Lee, Everything You Need to Know About the NSA’s Phone Records 
Scandal, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (June 6, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk
blog/wp/2013/06/06/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-nsa-scandal [http://perma.cc/7G3J-
RQUJ] (“[T]he NSA is seeking [phone] records from everyone, even if they’ve never made an 
international phone call.”).  
 99. See Emma Roller, This Is What Section 215 of the Patriot Act Does, SLATE: WEIGEL 
(June 7, 2013), http://www.slate.com/blogs/weigel/2013/06/07/nsa_prism_scandal_what_patriot_
act_section_215_does.html [http://perma.cc/Q8QM-EBJW] (explaining that the NSA’s data 
collection is authorized under Section 215 of the Patriot Act, and that the Section appears to 
“appl[y] not only to phone metadata but also to email, chats, photos, video, logins, and other 
online user data”).  
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although the Second Circuit’s decision in ACLU v. Clapper100 may 
give it pause as to the legality of this approach.101 
Aggregated data contributions serve to train machine learning 
algorithms, such that the data offered by one person trains an 
algorithm that impacts someone else.102 For example, Future 
Attribute Screening Technology (FAST) is a crime-prediction 
program developed by the Department of Homeland Security. The 
purpose of the program is to “rapidly identify suspicious behavior 
indicators to provide real-time decision support to security and law 
enforcement personnel.”103 The program focuses on identifying 
“malintent,” the present intent to commit future bad acts.104 
Volunteers are asked to perform disruptive acts, so that a machine 
learning algorithm may study baseline data of malintent to associate 
with behavioral indicators. The system focuses on a wide range of 
factors, such as heart rate, body movement, movement of the eyes, or 
pupil dilation, which might give away someone who is thinking of 
committing a disruptive act. The volunteers’ donation of information 
about themselves teaches the algorithms about others and, when the 
program is active, may result in the arrest and detention of people 
 
 100. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015).  
 101. See Charlie Savage, In Test Project, NSA Tracked Cellphone Locations, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 3, 2013, at A13 (suggesting that “any long-term, automated collection of a person’s publicly 
displayed actions might raise Fourth Amendment issues”); see also Gregory Ferenstein, NSA 
Uses Facebook and GPS Data to Identify Suspects in Networks of Americans, TECHCRUNCH 
(Sept. 28, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/09/28/nsa-uses-facebook-and-gps-data-to-identify-
suspects-in-networks-of-americans [http://perma.cc/R7HA-LWSB] (describing a comprehensive 
GPS tracking program ostensibly targeted at non-U.S. persons); Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: 
NSA Tool Collects ‘Nearly Everything a User Does on the Internet’, THE GUARDIAN (July 31, 
2013, 8:56 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-
data [http://perma.cc/CT6Y-N3N9] (stating that “NSA analysts have exceeded even legal limits 
as interpreted by the NSA in domestic surveillance”). For the legal underpinnings of these 
metadata-collection programs, see In re FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible 
Things from [redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *1 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013); 
Opinion and Order, [redacted], No. PR/TT [redacted] (FISA Ct. [redacted]), http://dni.gov/files/
documents/1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf [http://perma.cc/HTX7-GXGH]. But see Clapper, 
785 F.3d at 826 (reversing and remanding the district court’s determination that Section 215 of 
the Patriot Act authorized bulk telephony-metadata collection by the NSA).  
 102. See MacCarthy, supra note 1, at 445 (“Privacy externalities are composite. . . . The first 
step in understanding negative privacy externalities is to understand how data collectors, 
aggregators, and analysts can infer information about individuals . . . .”). 
 103. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE FUTURE 
ATTRIBUTE SCREENING TECHNOLOGY (FAST) PROJECT 2 (2008), https://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_st_fast.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3E4-6PNC]. 
 104. See id. 
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based on their supposed malintent.105 That is, the generosity of 
volunteers with respect to their personal data creates a system that 
almost exclusively impacts others. 
C. Privacy’s Individualism Bias 
While the reality of data sharing and parsing has changed, 
privacy theory has lagged. Privacy theorists differ famously and 
widely on the proper conception of privacy,106 but these many theories 
tend to share an underlying theoretical assumption. Most dominant 
theories of privacy view it through the lens of individualism.107 These 
theories may touch on the social dimension of privacy,108 but they do 
not strongly engage the social dilemma of privacy.109 
1. Individualism’s Historical Influence.  To show the deep roots 
of individualism’s hold on privacy discourse, we draw on foundational 
examples.110 Consider The Right to Privacy,111 the seminal U.S. work 
on legal protection of privacy by attorney Samuel Warren and future 
 
 105. See generally Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming Sept. 
2015) (arguing that the government’s overreliance on big data and metadata may deprive 
citizens of their due process rights). 
 106. See Solove, Privacy, supra note 64, at 1099–1123 (gathering and challenging essentialist 
conceptions of privacy).  
 107. See REGAN, supra note 38, at 3; Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: 
Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 958 (1989) (“[P]rivacy 
rests upon an individualist concept of society.”).  
 108. See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 
1664 (1999) [hereinafter Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy] (“As Post observes, information 
privacy is not ‘a value asserted by individuals against the demands of a curious and intrusive 
society,’ but a necessary aspect of relations with others.”); see also Post, supra note 107, at 962–
63 (noting that “each ‘individual must rely on others to complete the picture of him of which he 
himself is allowed to paint only certain parts’”). 
 109. We are not the first to note the zeroing in on individualism. As Priscilla Regan writes, 
“[I]n policy debates in the United States, the emphasis has been on achieving the goal of 
protecting the privacy of individuals rather than curtailing the surveillance activities of 
organizations. . . . It was thought that by protecting individual privacy, the surveillance activities 
of organizations and the government would be checked.” REGAN, supra note 38, at 3. Thus, 
“[a]lthough privacy is viewed as a boundary separating the individual from society, the 
dominant assumption has been that only the individual has an interest in that boundary.” Id. at 
23. The result has been an emphasis on an atomistic individual and the legal protection of his or 
her rights. Id. at 214. The results have not been positive for privacy theory: “[I]ndividualistic 
conception of privacy does not provide a fruitful basis for the formulation of policy to protect 
privacy.” Id. at 4. 
 110. For a more extensive treatment of the history of individualism in privacy theory, see id. 
at 24–41.  
 111. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890).  
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Justice Louis Brandeis. The article explores the relationship between 
changing social mores and developing technology. Warren and 
Brandeis discuss the increased intrusiveness of technology and the 
media. Photography and newspapers served as the catalyst for the 
crystallization of privacy rights out of the common law. Warren and 
Brandeis’s approach has proven both technologically and legally 
prescient. For example, they wrote that “[i]nstantaneous photographs 
and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of 
private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten 
to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall 
be proclaimed from the house-tops.’”112 The same could have been 
written about Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, or Snapchat. 
Yet even Warren and Brandeis’s visionary approach relied on 
private rights defended by individuals. Warren and Brandeis’ “right 
to be let alone” is an individual right, not a tool that helps groups 
navigate a social dilemma. For example, they wrote that “[r]ecent 
inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which 
must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the 
individual . . . the right ‘to be let alone.’”113 They considered their 
“purpose to consider whether the existing law affords a principle 
which can properly be invoked to protect the privacy of the 
individual; and, if it does, what the nature and extent of such 
protection is.”114 Once noted, the focus on individualism is found 
throughout: “The common law secures to each individual the right of 
determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and 
emotions shall be communicated to others,”115 they noted, concluding 
that “[i]n every such case the individual is entitled to decide whether 
that which is his shall be given to the public. No other has the right to 
publish his productions in any form, without his consent.”116 
The traditional right to privacy as formatively expressed by 
Warren and Brandeis contemplates an individual’s control of 
information that originates from or bears on that individual and is 
therefore hers exclusively to reveal or protect. It does not focus on 
the spillover effects of information that is not just about me, or you, 
but us. The traditional approach does not focus on group 
 
 112. Id. at 195. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 197. 
 115. Id. at 198. 
 116. Id. at 199.  
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coordination as the problem, or on known solutions to the social 
dilemma. Overlaps exist, of course. Perhaps were Warren and 
Brandeis to write today, they might pen a new Right to Privacy, which 
would note that person A’s disclosure of seemingly innocuous 
information could be aggregated by computers, stored in functionally 
infinite databases, and then used to train machine learning algorithms 
that may negatively affect B and everyone else. But to do so requires 
a further development of the theoretical underpinnings of privacy to 
shed light on how certain information is not the individual’s private 
and exclusive domain, but rather bears on everyone. 
2. Individualism in Modern Notice and Choice.  Modern privacy 
approaches have developed and intensified the emphasis on 
individual notice, choice, and control over information flows.117 For 
example, privacy as control has emerged as a dominant theory of 
informational privacy,118 in part because it promises individuals 
(rightly or wrongly) the ability to both disclose and control 
dissemination of information online.119 
Although privacy as control is not an incurably individual-
centered approach because the tools of control could be handed to 
groups,120 the theory’s subsequent development and, above all, its 
operationalizing regime of notice and choice demonstrate the 
 
 117. See REGAN, supra note 38, at 24–41 (tracing the post–Right to Privacy history of 
overemphasis on individualism through legal and philosophical thought).  
 118. See THOMAS NAGEL, CONCEALMENT AND EXPOSURE 4 (2002); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE 
UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 5 (2000); ALAN F. WESTIN, 
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (defining privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them 
is communicated to others”); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968) (“Privacy is 
not simply an absence of information about us in the minds of others; rather it is the control we 
have over information about ourselves.”); James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of 
Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1167 (2004) (“The idea that privacy is 
really about the control of one’s public image has long appealed to the most philosophically 
sophisticated American commentators, from Alan Westin, to Charles Fried, to Jeffrey Rosen, to 
Thomas Nagel.”) (citations omitted); see also Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 
32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 820 (2000) [hereinafter Schwartz, Internet Privacy] (“The weight of the 
consensus about the centrality of privacy-control is staggering.”). 
 119. See MacCarthy, supra note 1, at 434 (“The informed consent model is entirely focused 
on the individual.”). 
 120. See WESTIN, supra note 118, at 7 (“[P]rivacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them 
is communicated to others.”). 
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dominance of individualism in modern privacy law.121 Notice and 
choice depend entirely and explicitly on individuals. Such regimes 
attempt to ensure that individuals know what is being done with their 
information, and have some choice as to how or whether that data is 
used. Notice is provided to the individual about information 
pertaining to the individual, and the choice is the individual’s to 
make. 
Even critiques of notice and choice tend to buy into the 
individual paradigm, rather than challenging the baseline assumption 
of individuality. The traditional response to the flaws of notice-and-
choice regimes has been that the notice and choice are not yet robust 
enough.122 The standard criticism is that consumers are not sufficiently 
informed about what is being done with their information, and they 
have not been given enough discretion in controlling their privacy. A 
standard solution is to argue that the quality of the notice and choice 
must improve. To achieve this, terms of use and end-user license 
agreements are made ever-more explicit at the direction of courts and 
regulators. The focus on comprehension and control supposedly 
enables the consumer to understand the consequences of her 
revelation of information about herself and control the information 
she offers about herself.123 In turn, the privacy-by-design regulatory 
trend is intended to incentivize companies to build tools that 
empower individual understanding and control.124 
This is not to say that notice and choice are not useful, merely 
that individual-focused education and empowerment appear to yield 
diminishing returns.125 Consumers quite rationally do not read the 
 
 121. See REGAN, supra note 38, at 27 (“[I]n two important areas Westin’s analysis moves 
away from further development of that social importance of privacy: the first involves his 
discussion of the importance of privacy to the individual and the second his analysis of the 
balance between privacy and other interests.”).  
 122. See, e.g., Jeff Sovern, Opting in, Opting out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control 
of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1094 (1999) (noting that consumers are not 
currently well informed and “often find it difficult to opt out”).  
 123. See Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 32, at 301–02 (“Thus, the appropriate privacy-
protective behavior entails ‘mak[ing] secondary uses of information only with clear, unequivocal 
user consent and control, and test[ing] these controls to ensure that the default settings match 
with the expectations of the user.’”). 
 124. ANN CAVOUKIAN, INFO. & PRIVACY COMM’R OF ONTARIO, PRIVACY BY DESIGN: 
THE 7 FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES 1–2 (Jan. 2011), http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/7
foundationalprinciples.pdf [http://perma.cc/WY97-SSAA].  
 125. See Solove, Introduction, supra note 61, at 1881 (“[E]ven well-informed and rational 
individuals cannot appropriately self-manage their privacy due to several structural problems.”). 
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carefully redrafted privacy policies.126 Even if they did, the controls 
produced by companies in response to privacy-by-design incentives 
are often left unused because of time costs of vigilance or 
complexity.127 Privacy by design has delivered strong back-end 
protection for consumers’ personal information that corporations 
deem proprietary, but it has not delivered strong front-end protection 
for information as consumers disclose it.128 
Even if individualized notice and choice did function as 
desired—and it does not—there would still be a problem. The notice-
and-choice approach to privacy assumes incorrectly that the 
individual is the predominant unit in the privacy conversation, and 
thus that each individual can and should manage information solely 
about herself.129 This is an oversight.130 By consenting to information 
gathering, a user becomes a conduit for gathering information about 
her entire social network, whether or not they have consented.131 
 
 126. See Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read 
the Fine Print? Testing a Law and Economics Approach to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2014); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Contract Disclosure Matter?, 168 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 94, 94 (2012); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does 
Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the Recommendations of the ALI’s ‘Principles of the Law 
of Software Contracts’, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 173 (2011); Solove, Introduction, supra note 61, 
at 1884 (“Most people do not read privacy notices on a regular basis.”); Daniel J. Solove & 
Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 
667 (2014) (“Social science research reveals that consumers do not read or understand privacy 
policies, are heavily influenced by the way choices are framed, and harbor many preexisting 
assumptions that are incorrect. . . . [A]ccording to one study . . . 75% falsely believe that when ‘a 
website has a privacy policy, it means the site will not share my information with other websites 
and companies.’”).  
 127. See Emil Protalinski, Survey: Facebook, Google Privacy Policies Are Incomprehensible, 
ZDNET (May 4, 2012), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/survey-facebook-google-privacy-
policies-are-incomprehensible/12420 [http://perma.cc/G542-FF8F] (discussing the fact that 
“consumers [have] a very poor understanding of how Facebook and Google track and store user 
information”). 
 128. See Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, Obscurity by Design, 88 WASH. L. REV. 
385, 418 (2013) (noting the failure of current online privacy solutions to “tackle the ‘front-end’ 
of [the problem]”).  
 129. See, e.g., Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 32, at 247 (“Scholars and advocates 
criticize [U.S. privacy policy] as weak, incomplete, and confusing, and argue that it fails to 
empower individuals to control the use of their personal information.”). 
 130. See MacCarthy, supra note 1, at 444 (“I want to draw attention to and emphasize 
another way in which informed consent does not legitimize the use of information. These are 
contexts that exhibit substantial privacy externalities.”). 
 131. See Michal Kosinski, David Stillwell & Thore Graepel, Private Traits and Attributes are 
Predictable from Digital Records of Human Behavior, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 5802, 
5802–05 (2013) (describing their study in which users’ personal attributes were predicted with 
high rates of accuracy based on their Facebook likes); Solove, Privacy, supra note 64, at 1104 
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Even if regulators were to succeed in making individualized 
consent to data gathering meaningful, the intervention would miss the 
essential point. Educated and empowered consumers would still have 
little say, because even if perfectly informed and empowered, they 
only control their own data, and cannot influence the sea of 
information from which big data algorithms work.132 The old canard 
that if an individual does not like a social network, she need not use it 
misses a critical point.133 Because so much information is provided by 
third parties, no one can truly opt out.134 If a person is not on the 
network herself, she can opt out of its individual benefit, but still bear 
(most of) its individual cost. 
The very notion of individual control or individual-centered 
notice and choice complicates group efforts to maintain coordination 
in the face of a social dilemma. To demonstrate the problem, we offer 
a thought experiment, which we term the “informed prisoner’s 
dilemma.” Consider a standard prisoner’s dilemma. If both prisoners 
stay mum, they both get a mild punishment of one year in jail. If both 
prisoners sell each other out, they each get five years. If one prisoner 
stays quiet while the other squeals, then the one who stays quiet gets 
ten years in prison, and the rat gets none. Individually, each prisoner 
will always want to squeal.135 No matter what the other prisoner does, 
a prisoner who squeals is better off. But the socially maximized 
outcome (for the prisoners, of course) is for them to cooperate. If we 
 
(“[P]ersonal information rarely belongs to just one individual; it is often formed in relationships 
with others.”); Jennifer Golbeck, Smart People Prefer Curly Fries, SLATE (Oct. 7, 2014, 7:48 
AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/10/youarewhatyoulike_find_
out_what_algorithms_can_tell_about_you_based_on_your.html [http://perma.cc/9VSZ-SD7W] 
(“[T]he most important lesson to take away from these algorithms is that you cannot control 
what is predicted.”). 
 132. But see MacCarthy, supra note 1, at 446 (“An information externality occurs when one 
person’s revelation of information reveals something about someone else.”). 
 133. See Solove, Introduction, supra note 61, at 1881 (“Privacy . . . fosters a certain kind of 
society, since people’s decisions about their own privacy affect society, not just themselves. 
Because individual decisions to consent to data collection, use, or disclosure might not 
collectively yield the most desirable social outcome, privacy self-management often fails to 
address these larger social values.”). 
 134. For example, Facebook maintains a “shadow social network” of information about 
users who do not use Facebook—populated by information provided by users who do. Violet 
Blue, Firm: Facebook ‘Bug’ Worse Than Reported; Non-Users Affected Too, ZDNET (June 26, 
2013, 6:05 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/firm-facebook-bug-worse-than-reported-non-users-also-
affected-7000017318 [http://perma.cc/ARF2-M8K6]. 
 135. See, e.g., Kreps et al., supra note 48, at 246 (explaining how the Nash Equilibrium path 
of a prisoner’s dilemma game results in an incentive structure in which each prisoner will always 
want to defect). 
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consider the prisoners as a group, then cooperating prisoners will 
suffer only two years’ worth of penalty instead of the ten that they 
collectively would suffer if either or both squeal. Neoclassical 
economics therefore predicts that both parties will reach the socially 
suboptimal decision to squeal. 
Yet conceivably the prisoners, being experienced at this sort of 
thing, may at first choose not to rat one another out. One way to stop 
this welfare-maximizing cooperation is to inform and empower the 
individual participants as to the nature and likely outcomes of the 
social dilemma. Imagine taking one prisoner out of the room, sitting 
her down, and informing her at great length about the nature of the 
dilemma, including the fact that she is better off defecting no matter 
what the other prisoner does. Consider the effect of empowering the 
prisoner’s decision, so that she is certain her decision to defect will be 
honored and will with certainty have the described effect. Providing 
the ordinary prisoner with that mental model might change how she 
sees the situation and might, thereby, make the dilemma worse. In 
short, if privacy is a social dilemma, the very education and 
empowerment that regulators rely on to ameliorate the dilemma may 
instead exacerbate it. 
3. Individualism in the Transatlantic Privacy Discourse.  The 
individualism bias also crosses major cultural and legal divides in 
privacy law. For example, approaches to privacy appear at first blush 
to play out differently on each side of the Atlantic.136 One narrative is 
that the United States focuses on liberty,137 while the European Union 
focuses on human dignity.138 Yet both philosophies look at privacy as 
a matter best resolved by informing and empowering individuals.139 In 
both Europe and the United States, the presumed goal is for fully 
 
 136. See Whitman, supra note 118, at 1160 (explaining how the United States and Europe do 
not possess “general ‘human’ intuitions about the ‘horror of privacy violations,’ but instead have 
different institutions that shape privacy protection norms”). 
 137. See id. at 1158 (arguing that the American notion of “privacy” is strongly connected to 
the idea of “liberty” by example of constitutional-rights cases argued on basis of the right to 
privacy).  
 138. Id. at 1161 (“Continental privacy protections are, at their core, a form of protection of a 
right to respect and personal dignity.”). 
 139. As a matter of private law, the functional difference is in the ability to consent to 
corporate data gathering. In Europe, and speaking extremely broadly, consent to corporate data 
tracking is opt-in. In the United States, consent is opt-out. See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, 
To Track or “Do Not Track”: Advancing Transparency and Individual Control in Online 
Behavioral Advertising, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 281, 287 (2012). 
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informed individuals to consent to the use of their individual data. 
The problem remains: the data does not impact that individual alone. 
The Atlantic divide in privacy theory therefore cloaks an 
underlying similarity.140 In both legal orders, individuals consent to the 
use of data that impacts nonconsenting third parties.141 Both the 
liberty and dignity approaches focus on empowering and informing 
individuals, rather than improving group coordination.142 U.S. and 
European law differ on whether individuals must opt in or opt out of 
data collection and processing. They differ on the scope and timing of 
the individual’s consent. They differ on the powers an individual may 
wield—whether an individual may demand that Google delete stale 
information pertaining to her, for instance.143 But both traditions 
locate the problem and its solution with the individual deciding in 
isolation—the individual must opt in or opt out.144 The individual must 
consent to out-of-context uses. The individual must pursue deletion of 
data that pertains to her. In both the United States and Europe, the 
law provides tools to help individuals understand and control 
information that directly concerns them. Both traditions lack tools 
that help groups of individuals manage coordination problems. And 
both traditions have little to no protection for spillover effects of 
information—information about person A that nevertheless imposes 
negative effects on person B, and everyone else.145 
The above discussion attempts to point out the serious bias in 
favor of conceptualizing privacy in terms of individual information, 
rights, and actions. This bias was present in the foundational 
conceptions of a legal right to privacy, and lives on today as an 
 
 140. See Whitman, supra note 118, at 1163 (explaining how the differences between the two 
theories are relative, but not absolute). 
 141. See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 139, at 285 (analogizing that placing the burden of 
consent on users is “tantamount to imposing the burden of healthcare decisions on patients 
instead of doctors,” due to the complexity of the online-information ecosystem). 
 142. See Whitman, supra note 118, at 1167–68 (explaining how the European conception of 
privacy, the “right to a public image of our own making,” comes from the same root as its 
American counterpart, “the right to control our public face”). 
 143. See, e.g., Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(May 13, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&doc
lang=EN [http://perma.cc/ED5L-DZRK] (holding that Google must delete stale personal data). 
 144. See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the 
Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 260–62 (2013) (arguing that “[t]he 
consent model is flawed from an economic perspective”). 
 145. See Lau, supra note 62, at 266 (“If a citizen wishes to be left alone on the Internet, and 
takes no steps to be on the Internet, the law does not provide any meaningful remedy for when 
a third party publishes information about that citizen on the Internet.”). 
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underlying assumption in the modern operationalization of privacy as 
control through notice-and-choice regimes. Further, a comparison of 
the U.S. and E.U. approaches shows that for all their differences, 
approaches to privacy in the United States and Europe both focus on 
individualism—one philosophy is informed by individual dignity, and 
the other by individual liberty. As a result, the social dilemma of 
privacy has gone underexamined in legal theory, as the following 
Subpart will discuss. 
D. Conceptions of the Public Good in Privacy Theory 
We discuss here three broad types of legal analysis of the social 
dimension of privacy. First, theorists often address the social 
dimension of privacy by generalizing from the individual case.146 For 
example, Alan Westin described privacy as the individual withdrawal 
from society.147 Under this approach, social privacy is valued primarily 
because it guarantees individual privacy.148 Social welfare is a 
fortuitous byproduct of happy individuals. A second set of analyses 
treats privacy as a threat to the public good, usually defined as some 
sort of interest in preserving security against criminals or terrorists.149 
Finally, there is a nascent literature touching on privacy as a public 
good, often through the lens of environmental regulation.150 We touch 
on each in turn. We note in conclusion that there is no treatment of 
privacy as a public good that examines the public-goods literature for 
tools to empower groups to resist privacy’s social dilemma. 
1. Privacy in the Public Good.  The first grouping of legal 
analysis asserts that privacy is in “the public good.” This can be 
difficult to distinguish from claims that privacy is “a public good.” 
These terms belong to different disciplines. When a lawyer discusses 
“the public good,” and an economist explores “a public good,” they 
are likely talking about two quite different things. The public good 
refers to what is good for the public. A public good refers to a good, a 
product, which is produced by groups under certain conditions that 
 
 146. See, e.g., REGAN, supra note 38, at 27–28 (discussing Alan Westin’s turn from social to 
individual accounts of the value of privacy, and offering a critique of the resulting 
overindividualization of Westin’s theories). 
 147. See id. at 28. 
 148. See id.; see also infra Part I.D.1. 
 149. See infra Part I.D.2. 
 150. See infra Part I.D.3. 
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create a tension between selfishness and cooperation.151 The public 
good is a general assertion that the public will be better off if x or y 
state is the case. A public good is a product, good, service, or other 
benefit that may not be produced, because everyone can share 
equally in it, whether they contribute to it or not. The public good 
does not necessarily suffer from a free-rider problem. A public good 
is defined by a free-rider problem.152 Actions taken to promote the 
public good are not necessarily social dilemmas. A public good 
necessarily involves a social dilemma.153 If one defines the public good 
as welfare, normally the public good increases if a public good is 
provided. Yet welfare is a broader concept, and one need not define 
the public good in terms of welfare theory. But it is also quite clear 
that not everything that is in the public good is necessarily a public 
good.154 
Much legal scholarship begins with the premise that individual 
privacy is good, and that because it is good, protecting privacy is 
socially beneficial, or in the public good.155 The problem is that the 
similarity in surface terminology, combined with the vague use of 
economic language, means that many legal analyses are confusing as 
to whether they truly address a public good. An assertion that privacy 
is a public good may mean simply that the author believes privacy is 
good, and will benefit the public.156 The assertion that something is 
good for each citizen individually does not mean that it is good for 
 
 151. See Ledyard, supra note 10, at 111–13.  
 152. See id. at 112 (“There are many theories [regarding what happens in public goods 
experiments]. One, the economic/game-theoretic prediction, is that no one will ever contribute 
anything. Each potential contributor will try to ‘free ride’ on the others.”).  
 153. See id. (explaining that “the group would be best off . . . (taking home $10 each) if all 
contributed $5. . . . From the point of view of this theory, individual self-interest is at odds with 
group interest”).  
 154. Actually, “a public good” can well be at variance with “the public good.” The classic 
illustration is a cartel. For each cartel member, it is individually best if all other cartel members 
sell at a high price, while she undercuts and attracts all trade. Hence from the perspective of the 
cartel members, cartel discipline is a public good. Yet antitrust authorities intervene whenever 
they spot a cartel because, for the demand side of the market, and for welfare, price fixing is 
undesirable. 
 155. See REGAN, supra note 38, at 27–29 (surveying the literature). 
 156. See, e.g., Joshua S. Levy, Towards a Brighter Fourth Amendment: Privacy and 
Technological Change, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 502, 511 (2011) (“[U]nlike the rights of an individual 
criminal suspect, [privacy] is a public good.”). Levy does define public goods carefully, and it is 
clear he is on the right track, but his distinction does not stand: the individual rights of 
defendants ought to be, to his analysis, the same good as privacy because it benefits us all when 
criminal defendants have rights. This public good is different from a true public good, a 
common good to which all share undivided nonexclusive access. 
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society as a whole—that is precisely the nature of a social dilemma. 
So assertions that privacy is an individual right which, when enjoyed 
by society as a whole, is beneficial, do not capture the tension at the 
heart of public goods. 
2. Privacy Against the Public Good.  Especially in political 
discourse, privacy is sometimes portrayed as standing in tension with 
the public’s interest in security, that is, that privacy is against the 
public good.157 The argument is simple and seductive. Bad people 
desire privacy to hide their bad acts. What a criminal seeks to keep 
private, the public wants to know. Thus, as Judge Richard Posner 
noted, “[m]uch of what passes for the name of privacy is really just 
trying to conceal the disreputable parts of your conduct . . . . Privacy 
is mainly about trying to improve your social and business 
opportunities by concealing the sorts of bad activities that would 
cause other people not to want to deal with you.”158 To this way of 
thinking, privacy interests stand in tension with community interests, 
and must therefore be curtailed in the name of the public good. This 
tension between individual privacy and public need to know 
particularly influences modern discussions of the reach and role of the 
surveillance state.159 We address this approach because it asserts a 
relationship between privacy and the public good, albeit one with 
which we and others strongly disagree.160 
The argument starts from a false point of departure, assigning 
negative value to all information that anyone may wish to keep 
 
 157. See Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1410 (1974) 
(“Governments . . . frequently confront ‘private rights’ with the ‘public good,’ implying tension 
between them that requires choice or accommodation.”). 
 158. Grant Goss, Judge: Give NSA Unlimited Access to Digital Data, PC WORLD (Dec. 4, 
2014, 1:46 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2855776/judge-give-nsa-unlimited-access-to-
digital-data.html [http://perma.cc/649V-9WTR]; see also Richard Posner, The Right of Privacy, 
12 GA. L. REV. 393, 394–401 (1978) (explaining the concept of information concealment in 
greater depth). 
 159. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & David Gray, Addressing the Harm of Total 
Surveillance: A Reply to Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 262, 272 (2013) (“[A]ny 
account of surveillance’s privacy harms is often resisted on the grounds that some surveillance is 
essential for the public good. But there is a line between surveillance that is essential for the 
public good and invasive total-information awareness technologies, and that line is easy to cross 
if unattended.”). 
 160. See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman’s” Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust 
Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1809 (1994) (“The pressing needs 
of an immediate crisis almost always will seem to justify a government intrusion . . . . Looked at 
in isolation, it is better to have the shoreline of one’s island of privacy partially eroded by 
government surveillance than to have the entire island overrun by barbarians.”).  
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private. Thus, for example, Posner does not wish a person to hide 
from a future potential spouse that he is sterile.161 By selecting 
harmful characteristics, Posner tautologically ensures that hiding the 
characteristic will cause harm. But this dynamic does not hold for the 
vast majority of private information. It is certainly untrue of 
democratic activists in totalitarian countries, people with high 
potentiality but no certainty of rare genetic disorders, persecuted 
religious or racial minorities, individuals with a minority sexual 
orientation, or with any of a raft of other traits. Keeping those traits 
hidden has no possible bearing on the economic decisions Posner 
supports, except that counterparties or the government may misuse 
the information. Posner suggests rationality will trump prejudice,162 
but numerous examples, from employment discrimination to religious 
persecution, put paid to that notion. Even more important: Ex-post 
comparison of the benefit (for a third party) and the harm (for the 
person whose private information is at stake) misses the point. The 
normatively appropriate comparison is ex ante. It must balance all 
benefits and all harms from making the piece of information in 
question accessible. 
In its most recent security-focused incarnation, the argument that 
privacy cuts against the public good falls short because it both creates 
a false dichotomy between privacy and security, and does not 
adequately account for harms created by mass surveillance.163 
Treating privacy as a security threat trades fear of terrorists for fear 
of one’s own government. Or, to cast things in the language of public 
goods, security is likely also a public good, with its own production 
function and its own problems of free riders or exploiters. But that 
does not settle the role of privacy within that production function. 
The question is whether one treats privacy-seeking behavior as 
creating an entirely private benefit outweighed by the social costs it 
creates for the group, or whether one treats privacy as part of the 
stock of social welfare, such that reducing privacy reduces social 
 
 161. See Posner, supra note 158, at 399 (“Other private information that people wish to 
conceal, while not strictly discreditable, would if revealed correct misapprehensions that the 
individual is trying to exploit, as when a worker conceals a serious health problem from his 
employer or a prospective husband conceals his sterility from his fiancée.”). 
 162. See Posner, supra note 11, at 406. 
 163. See generally DANIEL SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN 
PRIVACY AND SECURITY (2011) (arguing that many security-based arguments posit a false 
trade-off between privacy and security, and that surveillance imposes serious costs even on 
those who believe they have nothing to hide and therefore nothing to fear from surveillance). 
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welfare. We view a secure private life as an integral part of security, 
not a threat to it. 
Separately, there may well be opportunity costs between public 
goods, but it is not our aim to settle the debate as to which projects 
the public should choose. Nor is it useful to pit public goods against 
one another in pairwise comparisons. Why should we pit security 
versus privacy, and not against public education, or clean air, or any 
of millions of other public goods, or against the sum of all of those? 
We admit that there are myriad different public goods. The existence 
of many public goods does not reduce the need to examine each, and 
to maximize social welfare from investment in that good. Thus, while 
there may be opportunity costs between public goods in general, and 
even between security and privacy in particular, we maintain that 
exploring how to maximize the social value of privacy is valuable 
regardless of any trade-off effects between privacy and security. 
3. Toward Privacy as a Public Good.  The legal literature is not 
entirely devoid of the suggestion that privacy can be profitably 
studied as a true public good.164 For example, Paul Schwartz notes that 
“information privacy functions as a type of public good, like clean air 
or national defense”165 and that “[p]rivacy, from a constitutive 
perspective, is also a ‘public good.’ Information privacy is a kind of 
commons that requires some degree of social control to construct and 
then preserve.”166 Priscilla Regan discusses the “collective value” of 
privacy, which she “derive[s] from the economists’ concept of 
collective or public goods.”167 Regan suggests that “[r]ecognition that 
privacy has some features of a public or collective good would make 
clearer the institutional or organizational interests in personal 
information and the weaknesses of a market solution in providing 
 
 164. See, e.g., Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 
Information Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1253–54 (2002); 
Schwartz, Internet Privacy, supra note 118, at 832–33; Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy, supra 
note 108, at 1698; Schwartz, Property, supra note 30, at 2084–85 (“[I]nformation privacy 
functions as a type of public good, like clean air or national defense.”); Paul M. Schwartz, 
Regulating Governmental Data Mining in the United States and Germany: Constitutional Courts, 
the State, and New Technology, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 351, 367–68 (2011). 
 165. Schwartz, Property, supra note 30, at 2084–85. 
 166. Janger & Schwartz, supra note 164, at 1253–54. 
 167. REGAN, supra note 38, at 227. 
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privacy protection.”168 We take this suggestion as an invitation for a 
full analysis of privacy in light of what the public-goods literature of 
the past several decades has learned.169 
We further note a nascent literature that draws on existing 
environmental regulatory approaches to propose solutions to the 
problem of toxic data.170 The eco-privacy literature shares a base set 
of concerns with our public-goods analysis. For example, Dennis 
Hirsch analogizes spam to pollution,171 suggesting that privacy (in this 
sense, freedom from spam) is subject to a tragedy of the commons.172 
Michael Froomkin uses a similar characterization: “Many mass data-
collection activities, particularly those that take place in or through 
public spaces can be usefully analogized to pollution of the private 
sphere.”173 Eben Moglen notes that “[surveillance] is not the first, the 
last, or the most serious of the various forms of environmental crisis 
brought on in the last two centuries by industrial overreaching.”174 
There are therefore some similarities between our approach and the 
framing language of the environmental-privacy literature.175 That 
literature has the particular advantage of drawing on a rich and 
successful regulatory tradition, which has ironed some of the kinks 
out of helping industrial communities find and implement low-cost, 
high-value changes. As such, it provides a strong set of analogies for 
 
 168. See id. at 231; see also MacCarthy, supra note 1, at 447 (“When privacy is thought about 
as involving an externality, it is inherently social because privacy decisions made by some actors 
inevitably affect the economic interests of others.”). 
 169. See Schwartz, Property, supra note 30, at 2076 (“This Part examines and re-evaluates 
the skepticism regarding property rights in personal data; the following Part develops a model 
for propertization of personal data that accommodates these concerns.”); see also id. at 2085 
(“The traditional problem with relying on a property regime to supply a public good follows 
from two of the good’s qualities—nonrivalrous consumption and nonexcludability. A privacy 
commons illustrates both of these aspects of public goods.”). 
 170. See A. Michael Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance as Privacy Pollution: Learning 
from Environmental Impact Statements, 2015 ILL. L. REV. 1713; Hirsch, Inner Environment, 
supra note 26, at 10; Dennis D. Hirsch, The Glass House Effect: Big Data, the New Oil, and the 
Power of Analogy, 66 MAINE L. REV. 374, 375 (2014) [hereinafter Hirsch, Glass House Effect]; 
Moglen, supra note 92. 
 171. Hirsch, Inner Environment, supra note 26, at 15–18.  
 172. Id. at 24–28. 
 173. Froomkin, supra note 170 (manuscript at 30). 
 174. Moglen, supra note 92. 
 175. See Hirsch, Glass House Effect, supra note 170 (“If data is the new oil, then these data 
releases are the new oil spills.”); see also Hirsch, Inner Environment, supra note 26, at 28 
(“When a web site gathers and sells personal information about one of its users, . . . they cause 
that individual to lose a degree of privacy. This cost is borne by the user and is external to the 
business. It is a negative externality.”). 
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how to craft and maintain political coalitions to resolve particularly 
harmful collective-action problems. 
Yet our approach involves some important differences. Whereas 
the environmental-privacy literature draws on environmental law and 
the history of environmental regulation for inspiration, we draw on 
public-goods models and experiments, and hence focus on the 
behavioral dimension of the question. Environmental law is chiefly 
shaped by the experience of government in seeking to rein in large-
scale polluters.176 As a result, the environmental-privacy literature 
suggests government action or legislation to resolve the collective-
action problem of privacy.177 Whereas the example of environmental 
law suggests regulation to resolve collective-action problems, we 
suggest group tools to sustain cooperation with minimal outside 
intervention. 
The eco-privacy literature brings a fresh and welcome 
perspective, as well as a history of experience with practical 
implementation, especially for regulating high-volume polluters. Not 
all collective-action problems are the same, however. In considering 
that privacy may be a public good, we focus less on large-scale 
offenders who are most analogous to the factories of environmental-
law analysis, and more on the small but constant contributions that 
users make exposing data about one another, the prisoners in a 
prisoners’ dilemma. Both approaches are needed. Broad privacy 
legislation may be necessary to restrain mass consumer surveillance, 
and environmental law may offer a good place to start. On the other 
hand, broad privacy legislation has proven hard to pass, despite the 
broad base of popularity among the electorate for enhanced privacy. 
Whether or not such efforts succeed in the current political climate, 
another path remains open. 
This is where our approach parts ways (amicably) with the 
environmental-privacy literature. Instead of following a Pigouvian 
approach of seeking government intervention to tax or sanction bad 
 
 176. See Hirsch, Inner Environment, supra note 26, at 4 (comparing the information 
revolution to the Industrial Revolution, which “generated an unprecedented level of 
environmental degradation that far outstripped the ability of the existing legal system to deal 
with it”). 
 177. See id. at 43 (proposing a cost per spam email that would render spam activity 
unprofitable); see also Froomkin, supra note 170 (manuscript at 30) (proposing the use of 
Privacy Impact Notices “before allowing large public or private projects which risk having a 
significant impact on [privacy]”). 
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institutional behavior,178 we follow in the tradition of Coase and 
Ostrom,179 and mine the economics literature for tools groups 
themselves can use to sustain production of public goods, or in this 
case to maintain privacy. We are inspired less by environmental law, 
and more by the results of public-goods experiments. In taking this 
approach, we focus less on rules restraining large-scale bad actors, 
and more on the dilemma of groups seeking to cooperate in the face 
of a social dilemma. 
II.  PRIVACY AS A PUBLIC GOOD 
This Part draws on the past several decades’ worth of advances in 
public-goods theory and experiments. The Part then highlights certain 
specific group institutions, which appear repeatedly in this literature, 
as being particularly worthy of consideration for building tools to help 
groups resist the social dilemma of privacy. 
A. Public Goods and Bads 
Since public goods are desirable as a matter of definition, and 
public bads are undesirable on a like definition, the question is why 
there are too few public goods and too many public bads. The 
difficulty lies in the interface between society and individual. If a 
public good must be produced in order for it to exist, then the 
radically nonrival nature of the good becomes a barrier to its 
production.180 Since each individual shares in the good equally if 
produced, individuals have no incentive to contribute to the costs of 
producing the public good.181 Because such free riders benefit from 
 
 178. See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 3, at 16 (“Governments were viewed as outside 
agents who, through the imposition of taxes (or subsidies), could induce the externality 
generator to limit (or increase) his or her activity so as to achieve efficiency.”). 
 179. DRAMA, supra note 31; Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 
42–44 (1960).  
 180. Guido Pincione, Market Rights and the Rule of Law: The Case for Procedural 
Constitutionalism, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 397, 414–15 (2003) (“Nobody has an incentive to 
contribute to the production of a public good, since anybody can take a free ride on others’ 
productive efforts.”). 
 181. See id. Technically, the prediction that the good will not be provided at all hinges on 
the definition of the production function. If this function is linear in the individual’s decision 
variable, a rational individual only chooses between not contributing to the public good at all, or 
contributing maximally. By the definition of the dilemma, the former prediction holds. If, by 
contrast, the production function is nonlinear, the individual’s best response is no longer at the 
corner, but in the interior of the action space. With this change in the production function the 
dilemma does not go away. The good is still underprovided, to the bad is overprovided. The 
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the public good regardless of whether they invest in creating it, each 
individual has an incentive to free ride.182 Taken to its natural 
conclusion, this means that although each person would be better off 
(as a member of society) if the public good were produced, each 
person will choose—as is predicted by neoclassical economic theory—
to maximize her own wellbeing (as an individual) by not 
participating.183 The same goes for a public bad. If each individual 
benefits from not suffering the bad, but earns individual income from 
activity that contributes to that bad—and that income exceeds the 
allocated share of the public bad caused by contribution that the 
individual does suffer—then each individual will contribute to the 
public bad even though the existence of the public bad harms 
everyone, including that individual. 
The logic of this point is worth stressing. In a social dilemma, 
defection—by free riding on a public good, or contributing to a public 
bad—is a dominant strategy.184 Cooperation, defined as contributing 
to a public good, or refraining from contributing to a public bad, is 
socially optimal, but an inferior strategy from the individual 
perspective. If an individual seeks to maximize her own benefit, she 
will defect irrespective of her expectations about others’ behavior. If 
she believes that some or all others will cooperate, she is still best off 
defecting. She enjoys the public good provided by the contributions 
of others, and additionally enjoys the benefit from not having to 
contribute. If, by contrast, she believes that all others will defect, she 
will follow suit. If she were to be the only one to cooperate, she would 
be even worse off. She would not enjoy the public good in its entirety, 
but would lose the benefit of not having to contribute. The fact that 
defection is a dominant strategy follows from the production function 
that defines the public good. For the individual, her own contribution 
to the public good has a benefit smaller than the cost. 
 
individual only stops going to the extreme because damage on her would be too high. Classic 
illustrations of nonlinear production functions are quadratic. They are typical for harvesting 
natural resources beyond sustainability. 
 182. See id. 
 183. See id. at 415 (“So, unless the incentive structure changes, for example by charging user 
fees, self-interested individuals will not cooperate in the production of public goods even if each 
would obtain net benefits if those goods were produced.”). 
 184. See Ledyard, supra note 10, at 113.  
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B. Privacy is a Public Good 
Translated to privacy, the public-goods model assumes that at 
least some individuals calculate the following way: If I disclose 
information, I will receive a private benefit—access to an online site 
or service, for example. This imposes a cost on me, based on the 
personal information I have given up, and it imposes a cost on 
everyone because I have contributed to the overall lack of privacy in 
the culture. Yet as long as the sum of my direct costs and my share of 
the social costs (resulting from my own release of private 
information) is less than the private benefit I gain, I will choose to 
give up information to access the site or service. 
Thus, it makes sense to examine privacy as a social construct, 
subject to the problems of social production.185 Indeed, we contend 
that privacy is a public good as that term is strictly defined in the 
economics literature. Privacy will fall prey to social dilemmas. In 
weighing important decisions about privacy, individual and group 
incentives diverge. And without measured intervention, individuals’ 
fully informed privacy decisions tend to reduce overall privacy, even 
if everyone cherishes privacy equally and intensely. 
One way to perceive the problem clearly is to consider lack of 
privacy as a public bad, to which we all contribute when we post 
information about ourselves that generates negative spillover effects. 
Recall that public goods and public bads are mathematically identical, 
with only the framing of the problem changing. The production 
function for clean air can be expressed as the minimization of the 
production function for creating pollution. This framing switch is a 
powerful tool for understanding how privacy is a public good. It is 
much easier to perceive the problem using the public-bads model. 
1. The Public Bad of Lack of Privacy.  Online, individuals 
regularly face the following decision: they are invited to join some 
Internet platform, knowing (more or less vaguely) that they will 
indirectly pay by making personal information available. Take the 
typical social network. The individual damage a user foresees when 
leading an active online life seems reasonable. A user might reason 
that the likelihood of negative consequences is low, and even if an 
 
 185. Cohen, supra note 2, at 1908 (“The self has no autonomous, precultural core, nor could 
it, because we are born and remain situated within social and cultural contexts. And privacy is 
not a fixed condition, nor could it be, because the individual’s relationship to social and cultural 
contexts is dynamic.”). 
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event were to occur, it likely would not be momentous. The user may 
not perceive individual risk sufficient to stimulate abstention from the 
immediate and personal benefits conveyed by use of the network. 
The user knows she will reveal some information about her friends 
and family. Maybe the user knows one of them to be particularly 
vulnerable, but does not account for the risk of her own contributions 
to data about that person—few people understand or even consider 
that a message of sympathy in the event of illness might affect 
healthcare premiums. 
This is precisely the kind of reasoning the public-bads model 
aims to capture. The user’s anticipated individual damage is too small 
to outweigh anticipated benefit. Things would look differently if users 
were to factor in the negative repercussions of being generous with 
their private information on the privacy risk faced by others and vice 
versa. Yet as long as each user only considers the potential damage to 
herself, no individual would be concerned that anticipated damage 
outweighs actual and anticipated benefit. If, however, each user were 
to sum up the potential for damage resulting from her own and 
everybody else’s disclosure, she would see that the social balance is 
negative—implying that no one would want to join a social network 
where the business model is based on disclosing private information. 
Information-based public bads are not only a bad deal for the 
community of users at the time information is revealed, they 
potentially grow worse over time. The public bad of lack of privacy 
increases over time as a function of rising data storage and parsing. 
Technological increases in storage capacity and in the predictive 
power of machine analytics undermine incentives to seek privacy. 
Little is forgotten, and stored information can be put to ever-greater 
uses. Storage has now increased so dramatically that the sum of all 
recorded human information available in 2007 is merely a minute 
fraction of the information stored and parsed today.186 Search 
algorithms are now sufficiently advanced that this increased volume 
of data does not act to obscure, but instead increasingly reveals 
information about subjects.187 Individuals are less and less able to 
 
 186. Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Erik Luna, Digital Innocence, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 981, 998 
(2014). 
 187. See Scott Shane, Data Storage Could Expand Reach of Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES: THE 
CAUCUS (Aug. 14, 2012, 5:50 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/14/advances-in-
data-storage-have-implications-for-government-surveillance [https//perma.cc/K7M5-TZYB] 
(“Government at every level is experimenting with sophisticated surveillance equipment whose 
capabilities are improving as rapidly as every other kind of electronic technology. . . . It will 
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control and monitor the damage that their revelations may cause to 
themselves, let alone to others. Small contributions to the data pool 
provide bigger results. Individuals who face the social dilemma of 
privacy face three strong pressures to defect even if they are inclined 
to cooperate: they realize that their individual efforts will only cost 
them; that others will likewise defect over time; and that the 
development of technology tends toward ever-greater intrusions on 
privacy. No wonder, then, that even the most privacy-minded 
consumers may eventually defect. 
Treating privacy as a public good thus goes a long way toward 
explaining the central conundrum of commercial privacy—why it is 
that consumers claim to want privacy, but do not refuse valuable 
goods and services that come at a significant privacy cost to both 
themselves and others. We reject the facile answer that consumers are 
lying about privacy preferences. The answer is that they believe that 
due to the actions of society as a whole, they have no choice and no 
privacy anyway. Under those circumstances it makes sense to give up 
privacy-seeking behavior and seize what private benefit they can. 
2. Mapping Social Harm.  A key element of treating privacy as a 
public good is that law must be able to recognize the social and 
systemic harms caused by the collection, aggregation, and 
exploitation of data. Courts tend to focus on specific harm to specific 
complaining individuals, not undivided losses to social welfare.188 
Economists have a different sense of harm.189 Translating allocated 
social-welfare harms into actionable legal rules will therefore require 
patience and creativity. 
One question is whether group privacy harms can be sufficiently 
theorized to be legally cognizable.190 Early data-breach cases were 
often dismissed on the grounds that plaintiffs had not yet suffered any 
harm, because they could not show that their data had yet been 
 
soon be technically feasible and affordable to record and store everything that can be recorded 
about what everyone in a country says or does.”). 
 188. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148–49 (2013) (holding that the 
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the future injury they purportedly feared was (1) certainly 
impending and (2) fairly traceable to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act provision at 
issue—specifically, a provision that allowed surveillance of individuals who were not ‘‘United 
States persons’’ and were reasonably believed to be located outside the United States). 
 189. Sasha Romanosky & Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy Costs and Personal Data Protection: 
Economic and Legal Perspectives, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1061, 1062 (2009). 
 190. See MacCarthy, supra note 1, at 456–68 (describing evolving categories of harm related 
to information externalities). 
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improperly used.191 As one court concluded, “[p]laintiffs lack standing 
because their claims are future-oriented, hypothetical, and 
conjectural. There is no ‘case or controversy.’”192 
It has therefore taken some time to convince courts to sanction 
even direct, individual examples of data harm.193 The trend is 
promising, however. Thus, “[t]he more recent trend . . . suggests that 
in ‘lost data cases,’ an increased risk of harm, e.g., the risk of identity 
theft, is an injury-in-fact sufficient to confer standing.”194 On the other 
hand, the Supreme Court expressed skepticism in Clapper v. Amnesty 
International195 about whether plaintiffs who cannot show that 
surveillance harm is “certainly impending” can sue.196 
Diffuse harms of the kind caused by public bads take 
significantly more theory and experience to define than do direct and 
individual harms. For example, it is commonplace for an institution to 
suffer a data breach, yet to claim that no harm was done unless the 
data is actively misused in individual cases. Courts do not give much 
 
 191. See Allison v. Aetna, Inc., No. 09-2560, 2010 WL 3719243, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2010); 
Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1050 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (finding no injury-
in-fact in the mere possibility of identity theft); In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 246 
F.R.D. 389, 400 (D. Mass. 2007); Kristen Blanchette, Civil Litigation: Security, in 1 DATA 
SECURITY & PRIVACY LAW § 8.27 (Ronald N. Weikers ed., 2015) (“Putative class action 
lawsuits for large scale data breaches are often dismissed during the initial stages of the 
litigation because the plaintiffs failed to allege an injury-in-fact and, therefore, lack standing to 
sue.”). 
 192. Hammond v. The Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 08 Civ. 6060(RMB)(RLE), 2010 WL 
2643307, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010); see also Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 40 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring suit against defendant corporation 
after defendant suffered a security breach of plaintiff’s information); Lambert v. Hartman, 517 
F.3d 433, 437 (6th Cir. 2008) (reviewing defendant’s claim that plaintiff lacked standing to bring 
suit after defendant published personal identifying information from traffic citation on its 
website); Robert D. Brownstone & Tyler G. Newby, Privacy Litigation, in 1 DATA SECURITY & 
PRIVACY LAW, supra note 191, § 9:159 (“A frequent defense against various privacy theories, 
including common law, is that the plaintiff has failed to allege an ‘injury-in-fact’ sufficient to 
satisfy the standing requirement of Article III of the U.S. Constitution.”). 
 193. See Gavin Brody, DOD, Tricare Claim No Harm, No Foul in Data Theft Case, 
LAW360 (Nov. 20, 2012, 5:31 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/395323/dod-tricare-claim-no-
harm-no-foul-in-data-theft-case [http://perma.cc/TJF9-3LZ4] (reporting on this issue in the 
context of a data breach that affected 4.9 million Tricare beneficiaries). 
 194. See Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151, 166–67 (1st Cir. 2011); 
McLoughlin v. People’s United Bank, Inc., No. 3:08-cv-00944(VLB), 2009 WL 2843269, at *4 
(D. Conn. Aug. 31, 2009); Blanchette, supra note 191, § 8:28 (discussing Pisciotta v. Old National 
Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007)). 
 195. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).  
 196. Id. at 1143. 
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weight to the increase in systemic risk occasioned by the breach.197 
Yet such systemic harms almost certainly exist. One straightforward 
example of social-data harm is the increase in systemic risk of identity 
theft.198 The data pools created by companies are prime targets.199 
When an organization or company loses this information, the costs 
are not borne merely by individuals, but by affected members of the 
system and social groups. For example, a child of one of the authors 
was a victim of the Anthem Health Data hack, requiring the author to 
expend significant amounts of time and effort to contain the results. 
In response, the legal culture has begun to recognize the social 
harms resulting from data breaches.200 Law has also begun to respond, 
not only to the individual harms, but also to the allocated social 
harms of data practices. The theft of one piece of data is now more 
dangerous, because it can be used to link to other pieces.201 Of course, 
obtaining additional pieces of data further simplifies the identity 
thief’s objective. 
 
 197. See Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep Up with 
Technological Change, 7 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239, 239 (2007) (“It is often stated that the 
law lags behind technology. As technology changes and creates new possibilities, lawyers and 
legal scholars struggle to deal with the implications.”); John Burn-Murdoch, Data Protection 
Law is in Danger of Lagging Behind Technological Change, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 12, 2013, 
7:25 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2013/apr/12/data-protection-law-lagging-
behind-technology [http://perma.cc/22CB-AZD6] (“Data processing practices are evolving 
faster than the law can adapt to them, according to a senior British lawyer at an international 
law firm specialising in data protection.”). 
 198. See J. Craig Anderson, Identity Theft Growing, Costly to Victims, USA TODAY (Apr. 
14, 2013, 4:38 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2013/04/14/identity-
theft-growing/2082179 [http://perma.cc/4F6K-JENN] (“[I]dentity theft has become big business. 
The number of malicious programs written to steal your information has grown exponentially to 
an estimated 130 million from about 1 million in 2007.”). 
 199. See id. (“The most successful identity thieves have learned that it’s more lucrative to 
hack into businesses, where they can steal card numbers by the thousands or even millions.”). 
 200. See, e.g., Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151, 167 (1st Cir. 2011) 
(“Plaintiffs’ claims for identity theft insurance and replacement card fees involve actual financial 
losses from credit and debit card misuse. Under Maine contract law, these financial losses are 
recoverable as mitigation damages so long as they are reasonable.”); Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 380 F. 
App’x 689, 691 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[G]reater risk of identity theft presents enough of a risk that 
the concerns of plaintiffs are real, and not merely speculative.”); see also MacCarthy, supra note 
1, at 481 (“Harm can be probabilistic. Extra risk of harm is also a harm. . . . The increased risk of 
identity theft is a measurable harm.”). 
 201. This point is forcefully argued by James Fallows, Hacked!, THE ATLANTIC MAG. 
(Nov. 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/11/hacked/308673 [http://perma.
cc/F9ZN-NYFF]. 
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Thus, the trend has also begun to shift in class actions. In a 2015 
case, Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC,202 the Seventh Circuit 
held that the class of plaintiffs met the pleading requirements for 
standing in a class action responding to a hacking breach of retailer 
Neiman Marcus—the closest the litigation system has come to 
capturing group harms.203 The Remijas court noted that mitigation 
costs incurred by plaintiffs in response to a perceived, speculative, 
and remote harm were often insufficient to permit a plaintiff class to 
recover, but reframed the loss of personal data as posing a much 
more concrete risk.204 In distinguishing Clapper, the Seventh Circuit 
noted: 
Clapper was addressing speculative harm based on something that 
may not even have happened to some or all of the plaintiffs. In our 
case, Neiman Marcus does not contest the fact that the initial breach 
took place. An affected customer, having been notified by Neiman 
Marcus that her card is at risk, might think it necessary to subscribe 
to a service that offers monthly credit monitoring. It is telling in this 
connection that Neiman Marcus offered one year of credit 
monitoring and identity-theft protection to all customers for whom 
it had contact information and who had shopped at their stores 
between January 2013 and January 2014. It is unlikely that it did so 
because the risk is so ephemeral that it can safely be disregarded.205 
States have also been engaging in a concerted regulatory 
response to combat systemic risks. The theory upon which much of 
the recent state regulation has been based is that requiring companies 
to reveal data breaches, often regardless of whether the data has been 
used in the individual case, will permit consumers, insurers, and 
defensive-software designers to mitigate systemic risk. In recent years 
nearly every state has enacted breach-notification laws, and there is a 
push for federal legislation on the topic.206 
 
 202. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, No. 14-3122, 2015 WL 4394814 (7th Cir. July 20, 
2015). 
 203. Id. at *5. 
 204. See id. 
 205. Id.  
 206. See Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-
notification-laws.aspx [http://perma.cc/7EDG-KVBF] (“Forty-seven states, the District of 
Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have enacted legislation requiring private 
or government entities to notify individuals of security breaches of information involving 
personally identifiable information.”). 
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Notification is merely a first step toward addressing systemic 
social risk. A systematic and easily understandable account of the 
social costs of privacy failures is critical in order to move forward. 
Law often lags in setting definitions and boundaries for social harms, 
and the data context is no exception.207 Theory and science are needed 
to advance the ball. In the twentieth century, for example, law lagged 
the science of the social costs of cigarette smoking or using products 
like asbestos. The first cases were ones of direct harm.208 Later theory 
and science established harm to wider categories of people impacted 
by smoking or asbestos, even exposures to secondary effects decades 
later.209 Similarly, it is reasonable to expect that, as legal theory and 
data science develop, increasingly temporally distant and distributed 
data harms will become increasingly distinct and legally cognizable.210 
Data pollution causes other social harms that, while 
demonstrable, may need to be addressed outside of the individual-
centered forum of courts.211 For example, behavioral models derived 
from consumer data do permit more deals to close, but they also 
permit companies to extract nearly all of the consumer surplus.212 The 
resulting wealth transfer is supposed to be worth efficiency gains, but 
given declining marginal utility of wealth and the difference in wealth 
levels between companies and consumers, these gains may actually be 
social losses, especially if consumers suspect exploitation. Advertising 
relies on models trained on large amounts of information, which then 
 
 207. MacCarthy, supra note 1, at 456–68; Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: 
Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1736 (2010). 
 208. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1082 (5th Cir. 1973) (en 
banc) (affirming the panel’s decision that the plaintiff, an insulation worker, was entitled to go 
to jury on the question of whether his injuries due to asbestos exposure were voluntary or a 
result of unreasonable duress of circumstances). 
 209. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1336–37 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(“[N]ew groups of plaintiffs from different points along the line of distribution of asbestos are 
emerging. Potential claimants include warehouse workers, truck drivers, longshoremen, and 
spouses of workers exposed when the worker returned home covered with asbestos dust.”). 
 210. See Ohm, supra note 207, at 1733–35 (describing the history of privacy law and the 
current shift to preventing harm caused by Personally Identifiable Information (PII)). 
 211. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, No. 14-3122, 2015 WL 4394814, at *5 (7th 
Cir. July 20, 2015) (“For the sake of completeness, we comment briefly on the other asserted 
injuries. They are more problematic. We need not decide whether they would have sufficed for 
standing on their own, but we are dubious.”). 
 212. See BERNASEK & MONGAN, supra note 68, at 17; Dana Mattioli, On Orbitz, Mac Users 
Steered to Pricier Hotels, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23, 2012, 6:07 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB
10001424052702304458604577488822667325882 [http://perma.cc/9ZB4-YZ28] (“[T]he online 
travel agency is starting to show them different, and sometimes costlier, travel options than 
Windows visitors see.”). 
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can be quickly matched to what an advertiser knows about a specific 
individual. The more information available, the more accurate the 
advertisement model is.213 Consider the mechanism behind advertising 
selection. When a user enters a website, some parts of the site support 
advertisements. Those advertisements are targeted by means of a 
rapid, behind-the-scenes auction, in which the parties who wish to 
advertise to the user attempt to determine how much that user’s 
attention is worth to them.214 The better the match between the user’s 
proclivity to buy and the advertisement on offer, the higher the 
price.215 Person A’s contributions to the fine-tuning of the 
advertisement model therefore impact Person B, and do so in a way 
that Person A is not likely to fully grasp or deceives her outright. The 
more the advertising company knows about the potential customer, 
the better its ability to confront the customer with a message she is 
very unlikely to resist.216  
A further important appeal of data mining does not result from 
targeted advertising, but from targeting the actual offer. Behavioral 
models derived from consumer data drive up prices.217 For most 
products, consumers’ willingness to pay varies widely, both between 
and within consumers. Some consumers crave the new product, while 
others would only buy at a price that equals the marginal cost of 
producing another unit. And most individuals cherish the first unit of 
the new good much more than any additional unit. The more a 
provider knows about a customer’s preferences, income, wealth and 
 
 213. See Doug Henschen, Analytics Gets More Accurate, More Accessible, INFO. WEEK 
(Nov. 15, 2012, 5:10 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/big-data/big-data-analytics/
analytics-gets-more-accurate-more-accessible/d/d-id/1107416? [https://perma.cc/249Y-7S9P] 
(“The more data companies use, the more accurate their predictions become.”). 
 214. See Ad Targeting: About the Ad Auction, GOOGLE ADSENSE, https://support.google.
com/adsense/answer/160525?hl=en [https://perma.cc/MZ8G-VXW3] (“[O]ur ad auction allows 
advertisers to state the price they’re willing to pay for clicks on ads or for impressions served on 
AdSense pages.”). 
 215. See Ad Targeting: About Smart Pricing, GOOGLE ADSENSE, https://support.google.
com/adsense/answer/190436?hl=en&ref_topic=1628432 [https://perma.cc/BW2R-JQSC]. 
 216. Note that we depart from economic orthodoxy in that we do not consider pure seller 
price discrimination to be an undivided good. Perfect price discrimination is often seen as a 
route to economic efficiency, permitting sellers to offer the cheapest deals to those who can pay 
the least. Yet it is not—it merely ensures that the seller captures value that would otherwise 
inure to the consumer as consumer surplus. Given the well-established declining marginal value 
of wealth, we do not see wealth transfers from consumers to corporations in the data market to 
maximize overall welfare. See Matthew A. Edwards, Price and Prejudice: The Case Against 
Consumer Equality in the Information Age, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 592 (2006) 
(discussing perfect price discrimination and efficient outputs). 
 217. See BERNASEK & MONGAN, supra note 68, at 92–98. 
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consumption patterns, the better it can exploit her by offering the 
product at a price that this customer, in this situation, still finds 
acceptable.218 Often the provider has yet another degree of freedom. 
It can customize the product itself, and make this customer an offer 
that is just too good to resist. The customized product certainly gives 
the consumer additional value; otherwise she would not buy it. But 
the producer engages in customization because she stands to gain 
much more than the consumer.219 In the technical language of 
microeconomics, the producer aims at appropriating the lion’s share 
of what, with a standardized product, would have been the 
consumer’s rent.220 
The former outcome is of course a classic of microeconomic 
theory, and is known as perfect price discrimination. The latter can be 
referred to as perfect product differentiation: each customer gets a 
personalized product that perfectly matches her preferences. In the 
pure world of economic models, perfect price and product 
discrimination only raise an issue of distributional justice. Producers 
have found a way to appropriate the total social surplus. Efficiency 
still obtains. Yet one reaches this result only if consumers are willing 
to accept any small gain, even if it is grossly inequitable. A standard 
result from experimental economics shows that this assumption is 
likely incorrect. The situation is akin to an ultimatum game. In this 
game, a proposer has power to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer for 
splitting an amount of money received from the experimenter. If the 
offer is rejected, the endowment is forfeited. If the responder indeed 
maximizes profit, the proposer may leave the responder with the 
smallest positive increment, and keep the remainder for herself. Yet 
in the lab, such offers are almost surely rejected. Experimental 
participants would rather burn money than let the proposer exploit 
them.221 The same is to be expected with producers using perfect 
product differentiation to exploit consumers. If this is what happens, 
not only do individual consumers suffer, but society at large suffers 
 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 108–113. 
 220. Id. 
 221. See generally Werner Güth, Rolf Schmittberger & Bernd Schwarze, An Experimental 
Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367, 382 (1982) (“[P]layers 2 are 
willing to suffer a monetary loss if they consider the demand of player 1 as unacceptable.”). For 
a meta-study of the burgeoning experimental literature using this game, see generally David J. 
Cooper & E. Glenn Dutcher, The Dynamics of Responder Behavior in Ultimatum Games: A 
Meta-Study, 14 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 519 (2011). 
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along with them. A “deadweight loss” results from the fact that a 
relevant portion of demand that could have been served at prices 
below marginal cost actually never buys. 
Big data harms go well beyond user risk or consumer 
exploitation. Lack of privacy also harms the body politic, and 
therefore some remedial efforts must be political.222 Privacy is 
important to basic democratic processes.223 It is important for 
independent decision making.224 Privacy has been described as a 
human right, although this perspective has received more focused 
attention in Europe than in the United States.225 Even in the United 
States, the revelations of Edward Snowden show the potential danger 
of unrestricted corporate gathering of consumer information.226 The 
large amount of information gathered by companies was placed at the 
disposal of the NSA through the PRISM program.227 Other news 
revelations have focused on metadata collection. The telephony-
metadata collection typified by the Verizon Order appears to rely on 
the collaboration of telecommunications intermediaries to hand off 
information routinely gathered in the course of operation of the 
company.228 Under the order, Verizon (and other companies, it is safe 
to assume) must hand off this information to government actors on an 
 
 222. See Solove, Privacy, supra note 64, at 1153 (“[A] conception of privacy that view[s] it as 
a discrete harm, akin to a tort harm . . . is a constrained way to view the disruption created by 
the aggregation and uncontrolled uses of personal information by private sector bureaucracies. 
This disruption of the way that power is allocated between individuals and large corporations 
goes to the structure of our society as a whole.”). 
 223. See Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy, supra note 108, at 1649 (“From the civic 
republican perspective, the true promise of the internet will not be as a place for electronic 
commerce, but as a forum for deliberative democracy.”). 
 224. See id. at 1656. 
 225. Robin D. Barnes, The Caroline Verdict: Protecting Individual Privacy Against Media 
Invasion As A Matter of Human Rights, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 599, 599 (2006). 
 226. See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti & Michael S. Schmidt, Ex-Worker at C.I.A. Says He Leaked 
Data on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/us/
former-cia-worker-says-he-leaked-surveillance-data.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/4XVZ-HC64] 
(discussing the backdrop to, and possible ramifications of, Edward Snowden’s disclosure of 
classified intelligence information). 
 227. See Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine 
U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 6, 2013), http://articles.
washingtonpost.com/2013-06-06/news/39784046_1_prism-nsa-u-s-servers [http://perma.cc/L9HS-
NGPY]. 
 228. See James Ball, Verizon Court Order: Telephone Call Metadata and What It Can Show, 
THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 10:12 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/
phone-call-metadata-information-authorities [http://perma.cc/8LP3-AGWP] (discussing U.S. 
government collection of telephony metadata retained by telecommunications service 
providers). 
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ongoing and forward-looking basis. Pervasive government 
surveillance is not a positive democratic or humanitarian value. The 
damage is both personal and social. Citizens have begun to censor 
themselves online.229 Surveillance has already chilled discourse.230 
Socially, large pools of corporate-gathered data damage the societies 
that generate them.231 
Throughout, evidence suggests a slow evolution of law and 
theory from a sense of the individual damage of loss of privacy to its 
social cost. This Part therefore concludes that privacy and public-
goods models fit together with respect to the harms caused. 
Individual contributions both yield a private benefit (ostensibly free 
services) and negatively impact others’ privacy. Individual incentives 
to protect privacy track individual incentives in a public-goods model. 
The lack of privacy which results from the social dilemma corrodes 
further attempts to cooperate as people become discouraged, see 
others give in, and observe the growing strength of data mining. In 
each of these ways and more, pooled data harms citizens individually, 
in groups, and as a body politic. We are therefore confident that 
privacy harms track those recognizable from public-goods analysis. 
III.  APPLYING PUBLIC-GOODS THEORY TO PRIVACY PROBLEMS 
In this Part, we draw on the broad and untapped neoclassical- 
and behavioral-economics literature to seek new paths for the legal 
debate over privacy. As noted above, that debate does not adequately 
account for negative externalities on others resulting from disclosing 
private information. This Part therefore explores and tests solutions 
developed in the neoclassical- and behavioral-economics literature to 
ascertain the degree of useful fit for the social dilemma of privacy. 
 
 229. See Sauvik Das & Adam Kramer, Self-Censorship on Facebook, in PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WEBLOGS AND SOCIAL MEDIA 120, 125 
(2013), http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ICWSM/ICWSM13/paper/viewFile/6093/6350 [http://
perma.cc/8DW9-CMT5] (finding that 71 percent of Facebook users engaged in last-minute self-
censorship).  
 230. See, e.g., BJ Ard, Confidentiality and the Problem of Third Parties: Protecting Reader 
Privacy in the Age of Intermediaries, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 8 (2014) (arguing that, in an 
increasingly digitized age, the current regime’s protection of providers of reading material, such 
as libraries, rather than protecting the reading material itself, leaves gaps in intellectual privacy 
when readers procure their materials from third parties like Amazon). 
 231. See, e.g., ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 207 (1971) (noting that with 
“electronic surveillance, the climate or atmosphere of suspicion created by an accumulation of 
invasions of privacy is of far greater concern than the direct harm caused by the incidents 
themselves”). 
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Because we chiefly suggest normative approaches based on 
experimental results, some caveats are in order regarding the nature 
of experiments. Experiments do not attempt to describe what a thing 
is, but rather how one factor operates in conjunction with others.232 
Experiments provide two important advantages: they “make it 
possible to study phenomena that are hard, if not impossible, to 
observe in the field,” and they allow experimenters, through 
randomization, to solve what empirical social scientists tend to call 
identification problems.233 A typical experiment consists of a baseline 
and a treatment. Participants are randomly assigned to either 
condition. Baseline and treatment differ by one, and only one, feature 
of the design. On these conditions, a significant difference between 
the baseline and the treatment is proof that the one difference in 
design causes the difference in outcome.234 Because experiments seek 
to narrow the range of interaction, they do not capture every feature 
available. Indeed, they must exclude any other variable that could 
confound the result. It is therefore not a strong criticism to point out 
that an experiment has left something out, especially something that 
would have altered the experiment’s outcome. That is what 
experiments must do. 
This rigorous approach does leave a gap, however. 
Experimentalists generally refrain from offering normative or policy 
approaches grounded in their work, largely because some of the 
factors that have been left out to solve the identification problem may 
comprise important parts of the policy problem. This is where legal 
analysis and theory can provide some help. Lawyers fit studies to 
cases. They are skilled contextualists, trained to focus on the elements 
of different contexts that make the difference between different cases. 
Thus, while it might be unseemly for scientists to make normative 
suggestions based on their individual experimental findings, it is 
necessary for policy makers—and this includes legal theorists—to 
engage with the policy implications of the research. This is all the 
more necessary because legal theorists often overindulge in theory at 
 
 232. See Christoph Engel, Legal Experiments—Mission Impossible? 7 (June 9, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2276566_code251
559.pdf?abstractid=2276566&mirid=1 [http://perma.cc/BD54-FGGZ]. 
 233. Id. at 1, 7.  
 234. See id. at 7.  
FAIRFIELD AND ENGEL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/20/2015  3:26 PM 
2015] PRIVACY AS A PUBLIC GOOD 435 
the expense of checking intuitions against data generated in carefully 
controlled experiments.235 
This Part attempts to express the best of both worlds. It draws on 
the past several decades’ worth of experimental evidence on group 
coordination in the face of social dilemmas before pushing beyond 
the narrow findings of experiments to suggest normative approaches 
that might improve privacy protection for groups. We suggest 
potentially useful new approaches to a field of study that has a 
tendency to become mired in ontological debates. The purpose is not 
to suggest that the economic and experimental literatures lead 
ineluctably to these conclusions. Rather, the literature points the way 
toward possible solutions that have been unexplored or 
underexplored. This is the pleasant task of an early mover in a given 
subject: to point out what might work. 
A. Repeated Interaction 
Repeat play is a critically important feature impacting 
coordination on group welfare. If two anonymous individuals meet 
once, it may be that standard economic theory gets it right, and each 
may act selfishly (although query, then, why people usually tip 
waiters). These two individuals have no reason to care for each other, 
other than the circumstances under which they meet. The economic 
theory of public goods is just a rigorous way of defining these 
circumstances. Economists model these circumstances as a game. 
Players best respond to what they know or expect the other player to 
do. If this game is a dilemma, players need not even go that far. 
Whatever the other player decides to do, they maximize their 
personal payoff by misbehaving. In some respects, this is an adequate 
model for the problem of online privacy. A world of strangers is one 
in which I am unlikely to encounter someone again in a way that my 
past track record or future cooperation will matter. 
Yet the Internet is not purely organized out of an 
undifferentiated mass of strangers, but rather nested smaller groups 
with higher frequencies of repeat play.236 Within such nested groups, 
 
 235. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 9 (2002) 
(“Too much legal scholarship ignores the rules of inference and applies instead the ‘rules’ of 
persuasion and advocacy. These ‘rules’ have an important place in legal studies, but not when 
the goal is to learn about the empirical world.”). 
 236. See Kosinski et al., supra note 131, at 5802 (noting, for instance, how “location within a 
friendship network at Facebook was shown to be predictive of sexual orientation”). 
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people may reasonably consider the impact defections may have on 
others’ future incentive to cooperate. If I post an embarrassing 
picture of my friend on Facebook, she might do the same to me 
tomorrow. In such situations, it is more plausible to model the 
interaction as a repeated game. Typically it will be appropriate to 
think of a game that does not have a precisely defined, ex ante known 
end. If one seeks to induce cooperation in groups, this is good news. 
A repeated game with an unknown end entails a credible shadow of 
the future. If it becomes known that I have misbehaved by recklessly 
sharing dangerous information, others may sanction me, or simply 
start doing the same.237 The value of future cooperation may sustain 
present cooperation. 
However, if the end of the game is known in advance, then the 
theoretical prediction of cooperation changes. In the real world, 
counterparties rarely know with perfect certainty when a relationship 
ends. But some situations at least come close. Consider how a 
disgruntled employee’s incentives shift once she has given two-weeks 
notice. Unless she expects a positive letter of recommendation, she is 
unlikely to make personal sacrifices for the good of the firm. Worse, 
she may actively act in her own best interests against the interests of 
the group, by erasing data, or taking valuable information with her to 
start a competing business. This is a textbook “final period problem,” 
in which groups decohere when members know they will obtain little 
or no benefit from their continued cooperation.238 Imagine that a 
player considers whether to defect or cooperate in a public-bads 
game. The player would determine whether to defect by contributing 
to the public bad, for which she receives a personal profit, or refrain 
from contributing, which means that she only keeps her endowment. 
She may decide to cooperate because the future benefits of 
cooperation outweigh the single-turn payout she receives from 
defecting. In the last round of the game, however, she no longer has 
 
 237. Game theorists refer to this result as the “folk theorem.” See generally Robert Aumann 
& Lloyd Shapley, Long Term Competition—A Game Theoretic Analysis, 14 ANNALS ECON. & 
FIN. 609 (2013) (discussing game-theoretic models of cooperation between competitive actors 
when iterated interactions present the possibility of future benefits from present cooperative 
behavior). For an application of the folk theorem to a public good, see generally Kreps et al., 
supra note 48. 
 238. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE JR. & RONALD J. GILSON, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 566–67 (6th ed. 2004) (“In this ‘end game,’ there is greater 
reason for managers to act opportunistically. . . . Economists call this a ‘final period’ problem, 
referring to the fact that the agent no longer has the same incentives to serve the principal 
faithfully.”). 
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an incentive to invest in the future, and will defect. Cooperation will 
disintegrate as players realize that defecting earlier and earlier is a 
more profitable option, especially if they expect others do the same.239 
By this process, termed “unraveling,” neoclassical economics predicts 
that players will defect from the very first round on.240 
Behavioral economists have discovered some interesting tools 
for dealing with unraveling.241 The certainty that a relationship will 
end does not seem to matter as long as counterparties are uncertain 
as to when.242 If the likelihood of the game ending at any given point is 
random—that is, the game may end each round but it does not do so 
with certainty—then cooperation can be sustained in the face of 
unraveling. Players can sustain cooperation when they no longer 
know exactly when a mutually beneficial relationship will come to an 
end. 
A closely related phenomenon is that players may consider the 
chance of other players defecting. This could either be defection in 
response to the defection of the deciding player, or it might be 
outright defection given the incentives the group faces. A player will 
cooperate if a game has a certain length, and she does not expect 
other players to exploit her with certainty. As a matter of fact, 
cooperation can be sustained if the deciding player believes that other 
players might defect, but the game is long enough that the benefits of 
future cooperation are worth the risk. Thus, cooperation is 
sustainable in groups when the endpoint of cooperation is not 
previously established and when other people do not expect 
necessarily to be exploited. 
There is also cause for optimism because the experimental 
literature does not support the theoretical prediction of unraveling 
and complete defection, even when there is a known game end. In 
experiment after experiment, group members are willing to cooperate 
at the beginning, but learn over time to defect, because cooperation is 
 
 239. See Hans-Theo Normann & Brian Wallace, The Impact of the Termination Rule on 
Cooperation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Experiment, 41 INT’L. J. GAME THEORY 707, 709 (2012). 
 240. See, e.g., id. at 708; Robert W. Rosenthal, Games of Perfect Information, Predatory 
Pricing and the Chain Store Paradox, 25 J. ECON. THEORY 92, 92–99 (1982) (theorizing that a 
rational player will take an immediate payoff that ends the game, rather than continuing to play 
for a possibly higher payoff, because the player assumes his opponent is also rational and would 
do the same); Selten, supra note 48, at 130–33. 
 241. See Normann & Wallace, supra note 239, at 708–11 (describing a variety of approaches 
to game termination designed to address cooperation issues that arise in prisoner’s-dilemma 
games).  
 242. See id. at 708–09.  
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punished in a social dilemma.243 This suggests that people come to 
social dilemmas with life experiences or cultural commitments that 
make them predisposed to cooperate at higher rates than neoclassical 
economics would predict.244 This is likely because people know from 
experience that they cannot predict when another person may impact 
their life. Cooperation as a default is a response to the general 
unpredictability of social life. 
Repeat play can produce cooperation as long as the end of the 
game is not known with certainty, and in experiments, subjects 
demonstrate a willingness to cooperate early on even where the game 
end is known. However, repeat play can also corrode cooperation 
through the repeated experience of being punished by the social 
dilemma. Absent some form of institutional backing, cooperation is 
not stable. The longer participants unsuccessfully interact, the more 
cooperation decreases.245 
Effective application requires accounting for each of these 
effects. Fostering repeat play among more tightly knit online groups 
may foster cooperative behavior and reduce intentional malicious 
disclosures. On the other hand, repeated fruitless attempts to protect 
privacy are likely to induce an effect akin to learned helplessness.246 
Applying this insight to privacy, we note that features that 
remind users of the value of cooperation given the shadow of the 
future are built into social networks, but they are not ones commonly 
expected to produce privacy gains. First, certain aspects of social 
networks act to remind users that they are repeat players. Friends of 
friends appear on personal walls. Routine “Do you know x? He is a 
friend of y.” reminders are sent out by the social networks in order to 
encourage users to expand their personal networks.247 Social networks 
 
 243. See Ledyard, supra note 10, at 146–47 (surveying experimental evidence of decrease in 
contribution to public good by repetition). 
 244. For a study of cultural constraints that produce ordered systems without government 
intervention, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES 123–27 (1991). 
 245. See Blair & Stout, supra note 42, at 1763 (“[E]xperimental studies show . . . [that] 
cooperation rates are lower in reiterated play than in one-shot games.”). 
 246. See Steven F. Maier & Martin E. Seligman, Learned Helplessness: Theory and 
Evidence, 105 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 3, 3 (1976) (“[T]he learned helplessness 
hypothesis . . . argues that when events are uncontrollable [an] organism learns that its behavior 
and outcomes are independent, and that this learning produces the motivational, cognitive, and 
emotional effects of uncontrollability.”). 
 247. People You May Know, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/501283333222485 
[http://perma.cc/MBY8-3NP7]. 
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routinely scrape email lists, for example, to permit users to re-create 
their network of contacts within the network. These low-level 
reminders of the connection group members have with one another 
need not be limited to the moment a user joins the network. One 
might imagine a “featured contact” widget that serves to remind users 
of contacts with whom they have not spoken in some time, thus 
raising the perception of repeat play at the edges of an individual’s 
network. Even more valuable, given the insights regarding inequity 
aversion and reciprocity below, would be aggressive promotion of the 
privacy-seeking actions others are taking. In the same way that a 
network could inform a user that a friend is using or enjoying a 
movie, the network could inform a user that a friend is using an 
encrypted chat feature and has requested a key exchange. Even 
spreading “likes” of privacy-enhancing technologies would help.248 
It should similarly be possible to ameliorate the corrosive effects 
of repeat play. One step would be to give full force to consumer 
expectations of privacy through simplified terms of service and opt-in 
permission each time the information is reshared or sold forward. 
Even simpler tools might assist, however. For example, users are 
already in part empowered to delink their social-network content 
from posts or unflag from photographs that purport to represent 
them. This means that although they cannot control viral outbreaks of 
content about them, they may have some ability to manage the 
degree to which others use their data without consent. Individual 
actions taken to minimize the damage of others’ disclosures should 
provide users with strong, immediate feedback and verifiable results, 
 
 248. Such tools may align with the incentives of the social network. Providers are often 
willing to protect users’ data from certain privacy threats because they monetize that data and 
want no competitors—examples would be Facebook’s protection of user data from crawlers, see 
Grégoire Jacob, Engin Kirda, Christopher Kruegel & Giovanni Vigna, PubCrawl: Protecting 
Users and Businesses From CRAWLers, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST USENIX 
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY SYMPOSIUM 507, 507 (2012), https://www.usenix.org/system/
files/conference/usenixsecurity12/sec12-final30.pdf [https://perma.cc/33X2-CDBN] (“In 2010, 
Facebook sued an entrepreneur who crawled more than 200 million profiles, and who was 
planning to create a third-party search service with the data he had collected.”), or Google’s use 
of strong encryption in response to the Snowden revelations, see Nicole Perlroth, Experts 
Oppose Government Key to Encoded Data, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2015, at A1 (“Technology 
companies including Apple, Microsoft and Google have been moving to encrypt more of their 
corporate and customer data after learning that the National Security Agency and its 
counterparts were siphoning off digital communications and hacking into corporate data 
centers.”). 
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to avoid the corrosion engendered by repeated experiences of 
failure.249 
B. Group Characteristics 
This Subpart turns from an examination of repeated interaction 
to an analysis of the impact of group composition. The simple 
mechanism of the public-goods experiment divides individual from 
group incentives. The currently overexact focus of privacy theory on 
individuals should thus be supplemented with an understanding of 
how groups work. Thus, the observable characteristics of the group 
matter.250 One cannot tell how an individual will act with respect to a 
given challenge—say, that of preventing pollution or providing 
privacy—without knowing the characteristics of the group in which 
she finds herself.251 
For a starting point, we rely on John Ledyard’s parsing of 
characteristics that seem to impact group behavior.252 Ledyard 
identifies well over twenty characteristics that psychologists and 
experimental economists have examined for impact on group 
behavior.253 Subsequent research has identified even more. We have 
the happy task of picking those that we believe will have the greatest 
bearing on privacy in the age of social media and big data, but our list 
is by no means exhaustive. The following Subparts therefore discuss a 
range of group characteristics that bear on groups’ ability to 
 
 249. A legitimate although ultimately tangential question is whether companies would have 
the incentive to build such tools. We merely claim that these tools might work for groups, and 
do not argue who should make them. But we note that the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) 
current approach is consistent with an implementation of our suggestions. The FTC has tended 
to leave space for self-regulation by suggesting approaches for incorporating pro-privacy 
features while sanctioning only marked cases of deception or unfairness. See FTC v. Wyndham 
Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 612–15 (D.N.J. 2014) (upholding the FTC’s unfairness 
authority in the data-security context); see also Ira S. Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by Design, 
26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1409, 1411 (2011) (“In the United States, a recent staff report of the 
[FTC] describes a Proposed Framework with three main components: privacy by design, 
simplified consumer choice, and increased transparency of data practices.”); Solove & Hartzog, 
supra note 126, at 667 (noting that the FTC has recently begun taking enforcement action 
against broken expectations of consumer privacy, rather than broken promises of privacy). 
 250. See Ledyard, supra note 10, at 113 (“Economic theory suggests that it may be possible 
to change the institutions by which group choices are made in a way that causes the outcome to 
be closer to the group optimum.”). 
 251. See id. (“To know how to do that, however, requires anticipating how individual 
choices will change as the institutions change.”). 
 252. Id. at 141–42. 
 253. Id. at 142–43. 
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cooperate, and which we think have some relevance to the policy 
debate surrounding online privacy. 
1. Size.  Because many online social networks are colossal, and 
because we intuit that group size affects the ability to coordinate to 
achieve group outcomes, group size is a natural place to start mining 
the literature for insights about social networks and privacy.254 Social 
diffusion is popularly understood to reduce incentives to take 
individual, positive, costly action. The well-known murder of Kitty 
Genovese is often used as an example to demonstrate the impact of 
diffuse responsibility on an individual’s incentive to help.255 Each 
person thinks that someone else will surely help, and so no one does. 
Based on this intuition, early experimental efforts focused on the 
cooperative impact of increasing group size.256 
The experimental findings both confirmed and challenged 
conventional wisdom. Although evidence supported the claim that 
increases in group size lead to decreases in the ability of the body to 
allocate resources efficiently—in this case, by securing enough 
contributions to a public good—they did not support the hypothesis 
that purely increasing numbers decreased group capabilities.257 
Instead, economists Mark Isaac and James Walker, who have tested 
this question in the lab, found that the less players received from 
cooperating (their marginal per-capita return, or MPCR), the less the 
players cooperated to produce the public good.258 Provided the 
individual profitability of contributing to the public (the MPCR) is 
held constant, experiments yielded little evidence of a pure effect of 
group size. It appears that with a sufficient MPCR,259 even large 
groups can produce public goods.260 Later experiments by Isaac, 
 
 254. See R. Mark. Isaac & James M. Walker, Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: 
The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism, 103 Q.J. ECON. 179, 179 (1988). 
 255. See Tal Z. Zarsky, Thinking Outside the Box: Considering Transparency, Anonymity, 
and Pseudonymity As Overall Solutions to the Problems of Information Privacy in the Internet 
Society, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 991, 1008 (2004) (“Research has shown that when large groups of 
people witness acts of violence or anti-social behavior, responsibility tends to diffuse among the 
witnesses.”). 
 256. See Isaac & Walker, supra note 254, at 184.  
 257. See id. at 179–80. 
 258. Id. at 179–82. 
 259. Although the impact of MPCR declines in larger groups, the effect remains positive 
and significant. See id. at 196–97.  
 260. Chaudhuri, supra note 10, at 48–49 (“[C]ontrary to intuition larger groups are no 
worse—and may even be better—at providing the public good than smaller ones.”). 
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Walker, and fellow economist Arlington Williams confirmed that 
larger groups could be more efficient than small ones at producing 
public goods.261 These results provide a ray of hope for large social 
networks, or large groups of friends nested within such networks. 
Isaac and Walker distinguish between “pure” and “impure” 
public goods. By “impure” they mean that an increase in group size 
reduces the marginal benefit from contributing to the public good.262 
For such groups, the increase in size decreases MPCR, thus 
decreasing cooperation. For pure public goods, increase in size does 
not decrease MPCR, and therefore does not decrease cooperation. 
Following this distinction, it may be useful to ask whether privacy is 
best theorized as a pure or impure public good. Most goods fall 
somewhere in a range between public and private.263 Commentators 
note: 
The in-between points [between purely private and purely public 
goods] are occupied by impure public goods, whose benefits are 
partially rival and/or partially excludable. If, therefore, a good does 
not display both excludability (nonexcludability) and rivalry 
(nonrivalry) in their pure forms, the good is called impurely 
public.264 
Privacy has some attributes of a private good. My own privacy 
inures both to my private benefit in ways that affect me alone, and my 
privacy-seeking behavior positively affects others. Privacy can 
therefore be modeled as impurely public. Likewise, lack of privacy 
seems to scale nonlinearly with the number of contributors to a 
system. What a social network knows grows nonlinearly as a function 
of the number of participants and their contributions. Thus, it seems 
plausible that the number of participants could impact privacy’s 
social-production function. If this is the case, then the MPCR of 
privacy-seeking behavior will fall as the number of participants 
increases. This, in turn, might cause underproduction of privacy. 
 
 261. See R. Mark Isaac, James M. Walker & Arlington W. Williams, Group Size and the 
Voluntary Provision of Public Goods, 54 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 30 (1994) (“Decision-making groups 
of size 4, 10, 40, and 100 provide replicable results contradicting the widely held premise that a 
group’s ability to provide the optimal level of a pure public good is inversely related to group 
size.”).  
 262. See id. 
 263. See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 3, at 9 (“The literature often treats certain types 
of physical goods or services as inherently possessing rivalry or nonrivalry, excludability or 
nonexcludability. However, this can sometimes be dangerous.”). 
 264. Id. 
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On the other end of the spectrum, we can model privacy as 
approaching a pure public good. One person’s consumption of 
privacy—say, a couple’s decision to delay the announcement of a 
pregnancy—impacts those nearest to them, but may not have much 
impact on those with whom they do not share a social circle. The 
switch from primarily impure to approaching pure is likely a fairly 
rapid falloff once we are discussing the privacy of friends of friends of 
friends. 
From this literature we can draw several insights. First, the 
MPCR, or, in the case of a public bad, the marginal per-capita loss, 
within social media may not be high enough to sustain cooperation to 
avoid accumulating public bads. Isaac and Walker flagged high-
number, low-MPCR systems as those most likely to be plagued by 
efficiency problems. This describes social-media networks and mobile 
social media fairly directly. In these systems, the losses are so small 
and nonspecific that users may overcontribute to the system without 
realizing it. Tiny amounts of damaging data, logged from thousands of 
different sources, may not incentivize users to avoid loss, in the same 
way that smaller amounts of per-capita return, when spread across a 
larger number of players, are less likely to induce efficient 
contribution to a public good. 
To the extent privacy is best modeled as impure, keeping nested 
groups tight and intimately connected might foster positive 
cooperation and increase the value of MPCR as a tool for promoting 
more cooperation. One user’s contributions of data impact those 
close to her much more strongly. Small, tightly nested groups are the 
best place to leverage MPCR, since the users not only have an effect 
on each other, but care about the effects they have.265 The MPCR of 
privacy in the narrower circle is higher, the connections tighter, and 
the probability of future cooperation likewise higher. Tools to protect 
the privacy of friends will help nested groups produce privacy.266 A 
good example of useful tools would be controls, already enabled in 
certain networks, which permit users to differentiate between narrow 
groups of family and friends, and broader groups of acquaintances. 
This does, of course, involve a trade-off because users must identify 
different social circles, but they gain more than they lose by keeping 
family business in the family. 
 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id.  
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To the extent privacy approaches a pure public good—as appears 
to be the case if one considers the broad run of the Internet without 
reference to tighter, smaller groups—we are comforted that Isaac, 
Walker, and Williams posit at least an equal, if not superior, ability to 
deliver the public good. The experimental evidence provides reason 
to believe the size of groups, alone, does not disqualify them from 
cooperating on better privacy outcomes. This has positive policy 
implications: the further away (not necessarily in a physical sense) 
someone is from my social network, the less incentive I have to pry 
into their personal life, and the greater my incentive may be to 
contribute to systems that protect everyone across the system. 
2. Player Heterogeneity and Conditional Cooperation.  The 
literature that followed then began to look more closely at group 
composition in order to find out why some groups can provide public 
goods and others fail.267 As one commenter notes, “The most notable 
[recent] finding in the area is that many participants behave as 
‘conditional cooperators,’ whose contribution to the public good is 
positively correlated with their beliefs about the contributions to be 
made by their group members.”268 Conditional cooperators are not 
altruists. They do not aim at improving others’ utility, irrespective of 
who those others are or what they do. But if a conditional cooperator 
is sufficiently optimistic that others will resist the temptation to 
exploit them, they are willing to resist that temptation as well. In the 
context of online information sharing, conditional cooperation 
implies that an individual is willing to resist the immediate urge to 
post some piece of information, and thereby to expose others to 
informational risk, as long as she is sufficiently optimistic that many 
others will also be cautious. Thus, who one plays with is as important 
as the rules of the game or the number of players.269 “This idea that 
there may be different types of players” was suggested by prior 
literature, but has only been systematically explored in the last 
decade.270 
 
 267. See Chaudhuri, supra note 10, at 48.  
 268. See id. at 49. 
 269. See id. 
 270. See id. (“We have now come to realize that the usual decaying pattern of contributions 
can be better understood by appealing to heterogeneity in the types of players interacting with 
one another.”). 
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The experiments that have identified conditional cooperation 
test participants in the context of simultaneous one-shot games.271 In 
the field, however, many more options are available to a person 
seeking to determine whether to make private information available 
online. Even if not within the confines of a group of known others, 
the individual has had a chance to observe the online platform for a 
while. In the technical language of behavioral economics, such a 
person is not forced to rely exclusively on her beliefs, and may update 
beliefs through her own experiences or those of others, and the 
individual has little reason to expect others to manipulate her 
impressions.272 This is good news. If conditional cooperation is as 
relevant for information sharing as it is for monetary contributions to 
experimental public-good games, chances are that the information 
owners will cooperate to at least mitigate the dilemma. One could 
expect them to act to mitigate privacy harms as long as they gain the 
impression that a sufficient fraction of the relevant population will do 
the same. 
The motives that drive conditional cooperation are not yet finally 
settled. Two explanations have found considerable experimental 
support: distributional equity (“inequity aversion”),273 and 
reciprocity.274 Inequity aversion exclusively looks at outcomes. A 
person is inequity averse if she cares not only about absolute profit, 
but also about relative profit. Inequity-averse individuals do not want 
to get less than others, and also possibly feel uncomfortable when 
they get more than others. In the context of online information 
sharing, inequity aversion could support conditional cooperation if 
the typical user of the platform in question perceives most other users 
 
 271. See generally Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gächter, Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the 
Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 541 (2010) 
(measuring participants’ cooperation preferences as well as participants’ beliefs about others’ 
contributions); Urs Fischbacher, Simon Gächter & Ernst Fehr, Are People Conditionally 
Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment, 71 ECON. LETTERS 397 (2001) (stating 
that participants played the game knowing they would not be exposed to the other participants 
again). 
 272. For a canonical treatment, see generally Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. 
ECON. 355 (1973). 
 273. See Chaudhuri, supra note 10, at 50 (discussing Ernst Fehr & Klaus Schmidt, A Theory 
of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation, 114 Q.J. Econ. 817 (1999); Gary E. Bolton & Axel 
Ockenfels, ERC—A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 166 
(2000)). 
 274. See id. at 50 (discussing Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and 
Economics, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 1281 (1993); Martin Dufwenberg & Georg Kirchsteiger, A 
Theory of Sequential Reciprocity, 47 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 268 (2004)). 
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to act as she will. If that is the case, by misbehaving herself she 
exposes others to inequity (in the form of risk or damage) while she 
reaps the immediate gains from disclosing information. If she is 
sufficiently averse to doing that, this may suffice to support an 
environment where little potentially critical information leaks out. 
Yet the more this individual is skeptical about the behavior of others 
on that same platform, the more she faces the risk of being herself the 
one who suffers from their irresponsible behavior. That would lead to 
disadvantageous inequity. In line with the experimental evidence, 
models of inequity aversion tend to show that the disutility from 
being exploited is more pronounced than the disutility from being an 
exploiter.275 Yet if the individual is sufficiently optimistic about the 
behavior of relevant others, the risk of being exploited herself 
becomes negligible. 
The difficulty with inequity aversion is that it may cause groups 
to coordinate on bad outcomes. If being treated equally is more 
important to individuals than being treated well (in the absolute 
sense), groups may choose to coordinate on the easier and worse 
every-person-for-herself defection outcome in a social dilemma, 
rather than on the harder and better coordinated outcome that 
maximizes social welfare. Applying this insight to the privacy context, 
one is more likely to cooperate in an environment in which each 
person is perceived to benefit from privacy equally. If privacy 
protections are perceived to yield unequal benefits, individuals are 
more likely to defect, especially if they fear being disadvantaged. 
Inequity aversion may explain the strength of the “nothing-to-hide” 
fallacy that plagues privacy discussions. The claim does not at first 
make sense: as Daniel Solove has repeatedly argued, even those with 
nothing to hide suffer nonzero costs of surveillance.276 Why then resist 
privacy rules that benefit both oneself and others? One possible 
answer suggested by the experimental evidence above is that 
individuals may assume that bad actors benefit from privacy more 
 
 275. See Ernst Fehr & Klaus Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation, 
114 Q.J. Econ. 817, 822 (1999). For the empirics, see Mariana Blanco, Dirk Engelmann & Hans-
Theo Normann, A Within-Subject Analysis of Other-Regarding Preferences, 72 GAMES & ECON. 
BEHAV. 321, 321–37 (2011). 
 276. See Daniel J. Solove, Why Privacy Matters Even If You Have Nothing to Hide, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC. (May 15, 2011), https://chronicle.com/article/Why-Privacy-Matters-Even-if/
127461 [http://perma.cc/T2TA-J2FB] (“With the disclosure of secrets, the harm is that your 
concealed information is spread to others. With the peeping Tom, the harm is that you’re being 
watched.”). 
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than other people. Because the bulk of the population consider 
themselves not to be bad actors, they consider themselves 
comparatively disadvantaged by such an outcome. It is difficult to 
find any other reason to resist rules that offer a small benefit to me 
and a large benefit to someone else. The difference in outcome may 
generate aversion to producing the benefit. 
Leveraging inequity aversion to create privacy will have two 
components. First, education initiatives could focus on the benefit of 
privacy to each person and smoothing out perceptions of unequal 
outcomes in privacy protection. Second, initiatives could help 
coordinate users on the better equality option of group cooperation, 
rather than the worse equality option of individual defection. 
Inequity-averse groups want everyone to be equal—equally well off, 
or equally harmed. By anchoring expectation on the equal benefits of 
privacy to all, rather than the dystopian equality of no privacy at all, 
such initiatives may focus the effect of inequity aversion on 
generating socially positive outcomes. 
Reciprocity, the other explanation for conditional cooperation, 
focuses on perceived intentions rather than outcomes. If reciprocity is 
the driving force, conditional cooperation obtains if the individual 
observes or believes that a sufficient fraction of the relevant others is 
acting in good faith.277 We may refuse to participate in the production 
of public goods because we do not trust others to participate. 
Conversely, we may be willing to cooperate on the condition that we 
receive sufficiently strong evidence of others’ intent. Thus, “studies 
have found that players are much more likely to cooperate in a social 
dilemma when they expect their fellow players to cooperate.”278 
Evidence of outcomes may or may not be informative about others’ 
intentions. If the other person’s actions directly and predictably 
caused harm to the conditional cooperator, the cooperator might 
reasonably infer bad intent. More importantly, if the other person 
could have acted to cause clear harm, and did not, trust may build, 
fostering cooperation on group goals. On the other hand, if one were 
able to prove that a negative outcome was caused by random chance, 
and not by the bad intent of other group members, a conditional 
cooperator motivated by reciprocity would continue to be willing to 
cooperate despite a bad outcome. 
 
 277. Blair & Stout, supra note 42, at 1772 (“Studies have found that players are much more 
likely to cooperate in a social dilemma when they expect their fellow players to cooperate.”). 
 278. Id. 
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Applied to online privacy, reciprocity theory yields significantly 
different policy suggestions than does inequity aversion. For example, 
reciprocity could work to sustain cooperation with respect to 
correlated information, as with the typical picture in which others 
feature together with me. In such a case, the outcome provides good 
information about the intent of the poster. For eBay, Instagram, 
Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, and other channels that permit actions 
from which intention can be inferred, reciprocity can be expected to 
play a significant role. But information about intentions is much more 
difficult to get if the main risk is other people providing grist for 
better pattern recognition by machine learning algorithms. What is 
needed is an expression of the positive intentions of others. 
Advertisements where one actor deletes an embarrassing photo of 
someone else, or advertising campaigns highlighting steps one can 
take to protect the privacy of others will help to generate a sense of 
positive intent on the part of other group members. Testimonials, 
repeat experience, or reputation-rating systems for friends within 
narrow social circles can help build a sense of who is trustworthy and 
who is not.279 This trust building within social circles cuts against the 
current approach, which is to promote through schools and 
advertising that no one can be trusted online. That approach triggers 
negative views of others’ intentions, causing conditional cooperation 
to fail as each person seeks to protect herself alone. Indeed, the 
negative view of others’ intentions would cause reciprocity-based 
conditional cooperation to fail even without any experienced negative 
consequences of others’ bad actions. 
C. Tools to Resist Social Dilemmas 
The tools that foster coordination in groups are different from 
those needed by individuals to protect their private interests. The 
economics literature, both experimental and classical, indicate four 
tools designers can use to increase group coordination: the marginal 
value of investing in the public good, the ability of members to 
communicate with one another, the possibility of sending a targeted 
reaction (often a sanction) to those whose behavior an individual 
condemns, and changing the light in which individuals view the 
privacy dilemma. This Subpart addresses each tool in turn. 
 
 279. Of course, this remedy itself partly creates a new challenge to privacy, much like a 
medicine having side effects. 
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1. Marginal Per-Capita Return.  As long as the return from 
individual private investment exceeds the individual marginal payoff 
from the public good, neoclassical theory would predict that 
individuals would continue to defect completely regardless of the 
cooperation or defection of all other players. If neoclassical theory 
were correct, marginal increases in the payout players receive from 
contributing to a public good would not positively impact 
cooperation, until the individual payout for public-good investment 
exceeded the individual reward for being selfish. In the experimental 
literature, however, group cooperation is improved significantly by 
increasing the marginal payoff of contributing.280 In the lab, 
cooperation increases as the ratio of payout for investing in a public 
good rises relative to the level of payout on investments in purely 
private gain. The effect is confirmed and powerful.281 
The important policy question for privacy is whether modest 
incremental increases in the value of privacy-seeking behavior are 
useful, or whether we must raise the individual payoff of investment 
in privacy until it exceeds the value of selfish behavior, thus dissolving 
the social dilemma. The experimental results lead us to believe that 
increasing the payoff from privacy-seeking behavior, or decreasing 
the payoff from ignoring the side effects on others’ privacy for that 
matter, will encourage public coordination on better privacy 
outcomes even if careless behavior remains individually profitable.282 
We do not have to raise the payout from privacy-seeking to a level 
higher than the individual payout from using privacy-intrusive 
services.283 A modest marginal increase in the payoff of privacy-
seeking behavior ought to increase the overall amount of privacy 
society produces. 
 
 280. See Ledyard, supra note 10, at 141. 
 281. See Ledyard, supra note 10, at 150 (surveying the literature on increased MPCR). 
 282. See Thomas R. Palfrey & Jeffrey E. Prisbrey, Anomalous Behavior in Public Goods 
Experiments: How Much and Why?, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 829, 830 (1997). One of us has shown 
that the marginal per-capita rate not only has an effect on the level of contributions in a public 
good, but also on their sustainability. See Theodore Eisenberg & Christoph Engel, Assuring 
Civil Damages Adequately Deter: A Public Good Experiment, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
301, 301–49 (2014). Note, however, that the experiment is framed differently. It is concerned 
with the deterrent effect of an obligation to pay damages, and manipulates the certainty and the 
severity of this sanction. Yet effectively this translates into a difference of the marginal per-
capita rate of contributing to the public good, which increases the expected value of the 
sanction. 
 283. See Palfrey & Prisbrey, supra note 282, at 830. 
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Law can facilitate such humble increases in payout by providing 
even limited and incremental increases in the benefit consumers 
receive from engaging in privacy-seeking behavior. These approaches 
are often overlooked because they do not completely solve problems, 
but only provide a little bit of additional benefit. For example, 
permitting consumers to exercise per-permission control of the 
information that flows to and from their mobile apps—letting them 
revoke location-information permissions, or in-app purchase, or 
phone identity information—would not create comprehensive privacy 
protection. But it would help a bit. The experimental results lead us 
to believe that even these modest and incremental improvements can 
help to encourage positive behavior. 
Another practicable way to increase the payout for privacy-
seeking behavior is to provide consumers with a method for 
communicating their expectations and an enforcement mechanism to 
ensure those expectations are met. For example, one might consider 
the current dearth of enforcement surrounding consumer-set do-not-
track flags.284 The flag is a feature in every mainstream browser. 
Consumers must incur time costs to understand and set the do-not-
track flag in their browser. Even if they do so, however, companies 
continue to take the “no” of a consumer as a “yes.” Regulatory 
agencies have not enforced consumers’ preferences. As a result, the 
investment of time by the consumer in understanding and configuring 
even this most basic privacy technology yields no return. This 
corrodes consumer willingness to invest in even minimal privacy-
seeking behavior. It would be neither legally nor technically 
complicated to require companies to respect consumers’ choices. 
Doing so would raise the payoff for the consumer’s investment in 
privacy, causing those within the population who are willing to 
cooperate at this higher payoff to do so. In short, the MPCR 
literature suggests that small, incremental, and above all politically 
feasible measures to increase the payout from consumers’ privacy-
seeking behavior are well worth the candle even if they fall short of 
making investment in privacy yield benefits greater than self-
interested behavior. 
 
 284. See Fred B. Campbell Jr., The Slow Death of ‘Do-Not-Track’, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/27/opinion/the-slow-death-of-do-not-track.html?_r=0 
[http://perma.cc/4W5E-32LB]. 
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2. Communication.  Because social dilemmas are a coordination 
problem, communication is a powerful tool to foster group 
cooperation.285 Groups that can communicate can coordinate, and 
those that cannot are severely hampered.286 As an intuitive matter, 
therefore, the presence of robust means of communicating between 
group members ought to be a good way for them to coordinate on the 
creation of public goods like privacy. However, neoclassical theory 
predicts that communication will have no impact on a social dilemma. 
In a dilemma, each player should defect no matter what other players 
do. This prediction holds regardless of what other players might say 
about their intentions.287 
Experiments have again shown some interesting divergence from 
neoclassical theory. In experiments, permitting participants to 
identify and communicate with one another increases the provision of 
public goods.288 Lifting the veil of complete anonymity powerfully 
increases cooperation in dilemma situations.289 Cooperation further 
increases if individuals have a chance to talk to each other,290 and if 
they are given the ability to check and verify whether their fellow 
participants have followed through on their announced intentions.291 
Cheap, nonbinding talk does not appear to increase contributions. 
Rather, the effect appears to rely on communication occurring in a 
setting in which group members can assess the commitment of other 
players to contributing to the public good.292 Two broad causes of the 
effect have been posited from this research: the ability to 
communicate may promote mutual promises to cooperate, or it may 
build group identity and cohesion.293 
 
 285. See Ledyard, supra note 10, at 141. 
 286. See Rick K. Wilson & Jane Sell, “Liar, Liar . . .”: Cheap Talk and Reputation in 
Repeated Public Goods Settings, 41 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 695, 697 (1997) [hereinafter Wilson & 
Sell, Liar Liar]. 
 287. See Ledyard, supra note 10, at 156 (“If there is a unique dominant strategy equilibrium, 
as is true of most experiments without thresholds, then talking should have no effect on rates of 
contribution: we should see none.”). 
 288. See Ledyard, supra note 10, at 156. 
 289. Bruno S. Frey & Iris Bohnet, Identification in Democratic Society, 26 J. SOCIO-ECON. 
25, 27 (1997). 
 290. Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, Promises and Partnership, 74 ECONOMETRICA 
1579, 1582 (2006). 
 291. See Jane Sell & Rick K. Wilson, Levels of Information and Contributions to Public 
Goods, 70 SOC. FORCES 107, 119 (1991); see also Ledyard, supra note 10, at 156–57 (surveying 
studies that have demonstrated how verification improves cooperation). 
 292. See Wilson & Sell, Liar Liar, supra note 286, at 714. 
 293. See id. at 698. 
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These results provide both some insight and challenges for the 
provision of privacy online. It is difficult to imagine a digital privacy 
scenario in which participants do not have some capacity to 
communicate. Insofar as communication enables group coordination 
on welfare-maximizing outcomes, this is positive. On the other hand, 
the specific public good sought here is privacy. Identifying people and 
communicating information about them in the name of privacy may 
at first blush appear contradictory. The key appears to be to provide 
reliable feedback about the privacy practices of actors when 
compared to their past promises, not necessarily disclosing further 
information about the actor’s real-world identity. For example, it is 
not at all common practice for participants in laboratory experiments, 
even those testing communication, to share real names or other 
identifying information, yet their ability to communicate during the 
experiment helps sustain cooperation. Pseudonymity is not merely 
failed anonymity—pseudonyms permit people to build stable 
reputations and relationships and communicate with one another 
while limiting the real-world information they must reveal. For 
example, an eBay seller can develop a reputation for honest dealing 
under a pseudonym without revealing her true name, email address, 
telephone number, or address. Pseudonymous communication 
permits users to coordinate actions and convey information about 
past practices without exposing greater amounts of personal 
information. 
3. Sanction.  Some individuals do not care about others, or they 
even enjoy seeing them in trouble. Happily, they constitute a minority 
of those populations that have been rigorously tested.294 But for those 
in the population who remain indifferent to the costs of their 
behavior to others, identification and communication open up the 
possibility of shaming.295 Shaming is a social sanction, which is 
frequently used as a reaction to informational damage. Spread rumors 
about a sister-in-law, and expect to be ostracized at family gatherings. 
Air dirty laundry on Facebook, and expect to be defriended. 
Such commonsense intuitions are borne out in the public-goods 
experimental literature. Studies repeatedly show that the availability 
 
 294. See Joseph Henrich et al., “Economic Man” in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral 
Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 795, 798 (2005).  
 295. William S. Neilson, A Theory of Kindness, Reluctance, and Shame for Social 
Preferences, 66 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 394, 394–403 (2009). 
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of social sanctions is a very effective technology for securing the 
provision of a public good.296 However, sanctions often cost the 
sanctioning party.297 Not only does sanctioning activity cost the 
sanctioning party, it also gives rise to follow-on repercussions. If one 
person polices the environment, she bears the risk that others might 
pursue a vendetta against her.298 Even if one considers the risk of gang 
up or the costs of imposing sanctions to be small, most people find it 
unpleasant to assume the role of the cop. In the technical language of 
welfare economics, vigilance and sanctioning are contributions to a 
second-order public good.299 Yet the experimental evidence suggests 
that, from a policy perspective, one has to be much less concerned 
about this second-order public good, compared with the original first-
order public good. Society can rely on people being upset about 
others misbehaving, and trying to get them under control. 
In principle, this is good news for the protection of privacy. 
Informal sanction and social ostracism for bad actors is the norm 
across many online platforms. Features of most platforms support 
some form of sanction, from defriending to downvoting to 
shadowbanning, and such sanctions have the additional effect of 
limiting access to private information by the offender. If I act 
irresponsibly on a social network, for example, I will be defriended 
and my access to in-group-only information will be revoked. If I act 
irresponsibly on a discussion site by revealing the personal details of 
other posters, I will be banned. Yet sanction depends on repeat play 
 
 296. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Altruistic Punishment in Humans, 415 NATURE 
137, 137–39 (2002); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods 
Experiments, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 980, 980 (2000). 
 297. See Martin Sefton, Robert Shupp & James M. Walker, The Effect of Rewards and 
Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods, 45 ECON. INQUIRY 671, 673 (2007). 
 298. This is not a merely theoretical risk. It even materializes under the controlled 
conditions of the lab. See generally Nikos S. Nikiforakis & Dirk Engelmann, Altruistic 
Punishment and the Threat of Feuds, 78 J. ECON. BEHAV. ORG. 319 (2011) (finding that one-
quarter of all punishments are retaliated); Nikos S. Nikiforakis, Punishment and Counter-
Punishment in Public Good Games: Can We Really Govern Ourselves?, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 91 
(2008) (finding that subjects will severely punish their victims in order to deprive their victims of 
the funds to retaliate). 
 299. See generally Douglas D. Heckathorn, Collective Action and the Second-Order Free-
Rider Problem, 1 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 78 (1989) (describing how sanctioning systems 
manifest in second-level, or intragroup, collective-action problems); Toshio Yamagishi, The 
Provision of a Sanctioning System as a Public Good, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 110, 
111 (1986) (“[A]ssuming that people who have developed the goal of mutual cooperation . . . 
cooperate for the implementation of the needed structural change . . . rather than simply 
engaging in cooperative actions in the original public good situation . . . .”). 
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and identification, discussed above.300 In order for a group to impose a 
sanction, they must know who has defected against group interest, 
and they must have a mechanism that can deter future defection. 
Future defection only matters if the member to be sanctioned is a 
member of a group with the potential to cooperate in the future that 
can identify and sanction the offender. Mediating the balance 
between sanction and privacy can be challenging, but good solutions 
are already in place. Distributed database technology based on 
trustless public ledgers, such as that used by World Table or other 
distributed-ledger comment-curating systems, permit users to create 
persistent pseudonymous identities across multiple platforms—a 
worldwide online pseudonymous reputation. Once they do, the 
reputation of the pseudonym can serve as a sanctionable resource. 
Those with established reputations will be trusted. Those without will 
not, because they—like eBay sellers with no reputation ranking—will 
be perceived as attempting to avoid sanction. 
4. Framing.  Mathematically, public goods and public bads are 
identical.301 We have found the public-bad story convincing, since in a 
public-bad game the cooperative decision is not to contribute to the 
public bad, just as with social media one strong cooperative decision 
is not to contribute data that bears on or concerns others. Yet it may 
be that psychologically speaking, conceiving of privacy as a public 
good could have a salutary effect on attempts to help groups control 
third-party-generated information online.302 In a highly cited 
experiment, James Andreoni demonstrated that framing impacts 
contributions to a public good, or, conversely, abstention from 
contributing to a public bad.303 The pessimistic view of a public bad, or 
a “cold prickle” as Andreoni described it, seemed to encourage 
defection.304 The optimistic view of a public good seemed to engender 
contribution to the public good, described by Andreoni as a “warm 
 
 300. One straightforward way to avoid identification is making negative information about 
others available in an anonymous way (which presupposes that the victim may not, at least, 
suspect who has made the information publicly known). 
 301. See Andreoni, supra note 9, at 5. 
 302. See Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 128, at 417. 
 303. See Andreoni, supra note 9, at 2. 
 304. See id. at 13 (“[W]hen the positive externality is rephrased to be presented as a 
negative externality—even though the incentives do not change—the provision of the public 
good . . . [collapses] after ten iterations . . . .”). 
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glow.”305 In short, even though the decision to contribute private 
information that impacts others may be most accurately described as 
a public bad, it may perhaps be usefully described to groups seeking 
to avoid the negative effects of this bad as a public good. In discussing 
the problem with the public, it may well be better to encourage social-
network participants to protect the privacy of other members of their 
social network than to avoid contributing to the pools of data that can 
have toxic effects on those members. The one construction may 
create a warm glow, while the other yields only a cold prickle. 
The economic literature refers to such interventions as “valence 
framing”: the structure of the interaction, or its payoffs, are 
represented in some alternative form. An even more subtle 
intervention is called “label framing.”306 Some cue evokes some 
context that, one has reason to believe, will change how individuals 
act. For instance, it has been shown that experimental participants are 
much more likely to cooperate in a dilemma game if this game is 
called a “community game,” rather than a “Wall Street game.”307 
Likewise, participants cooperate more if the situation is described as 
a “joint project” or “jointly protecting against danger,” rather than 
“competition.”308 
Given this, it matters more than ever how society talks about 
privacy. If those seeking to jointly protect themselves against 
commercial and government exploiters of data do face a public-goods 
problem, as this Article has sought to demonstrate, it may help to 
name it as such. Too few seem to see their information-sharing 
behavior in that light. The experimental evidence suggests that it 
might be helpful just to let them know. Merely encouraging people to 
contribute to the public good of privacy may drive up investment in 
privacy-protecting behavior. 
Conversely, if society continues to debate privacy in purely 
individualistic terms, as it has largely done until this point, the 
 
 305. See id. (“People are significantly more willing to cooperate in a public goods 
experiment when the problem is posed as a positive externality rather than as a negative 
externality.”). 
 306. See Martin Dufwenberg, Simon Gächter & Heike Hennig-Schmidt, The Framing of 
Games and the Psychology of Play, 73 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 459, 461–62 (2011). 
 307. See Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naive Realism in Everyday Life: Implications for Social 
Conflict and Misunderstanding, in VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE 103, 106–08 (Edward S. Reed, 
Elliot Turiel & Terrance Brown eds., 1996).  
 308. Christoph Engel & David Rand, What Does “Clean” Really Mean? The Implicit 
Framing of Decontextualized Experiments, 122 ECON. LETTERS 386, 387 (2014).  
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experimental evidence indicates that the individual focus will lead to 
underprovision of privacy. An “every-person-for-herself” mentality 
will predominate, reducing cooperative behavior. Worse, as 
individuals fail in the face of the social dilemma, they will be 
individually blamed. Under the individual privacy narrative, people 
who do not benefit from privacy must not be trying hard enough, or 
must not value privacy after all. This Article has taken an initial step 
toward countering this narrative, by naming the dilemma of privacy 
for what it is, and by encouraging a positive framing for a 
longstanding conundrum of social interaction: privacy is a public 
good. 
CONCLUSION 
There is some ground for optimism in the otherwise grim field of 
data privacy. The current dominant approach of focusing on 
individual education and empowerment has fallen short. This has led 
to the strange rise of privacy nihilism, that is, the claim that since 
consumers cannot get privacy, they must not want it. The focus on 
individual empowerment underemphasizes the group or community 
dimension of privacy. 
The focus on empowering individuals has induced policymakers 
to overlook important tools for protecting privacy. The relevant 
privacy unit is the group, rather than the individual. Social dilemmas 
pit individuals against each other, and individual incentives cut 
against group welfare. In many ways, the more educated and 
empowered individuals are, the worse the social dilemma becomes for 
the group. 
Features of the privacy debate function in ways that are similar 
to a social dilemma. The well-known public-good (public-bad) 
dilemma best matches the contours of the privacy debate. It does not 
exclude other models. We merely claim that individual-focused 
approaches have reached diminishing returns, and that approaches 
focused on groups may yield more fruit for the investment. The 
public-goods model has a broad range of tools suggested by the 
theoretical and experimental economic literatures that have gone 
underexplored thus far in the privacy debate. 
In exploring these tools, we note a debate internal to the 
economics literature that has important ramifications for the study of 
privacy. Classical economic theory predicts that many tools groups 
use to increase cooperation should have no effect: in the face of a 
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social dilemma, all cooperation should collapse. Experimentalists 
have on the other hand consistently confirmed that groups resist 
social dilemmas to the benefit of the group and to individual 
members’ detriment, and that certain tools help. Whether this 
resistance to social dilemmas is learned and becomes a heuristic over 
a lifetime of confronting such situations, or whether humans innately 
struggle against social dilemmas, we take this struggle as a sign of 
hope. 
This Article proposes giving groups tools for this struggle. 
Policymakers should consider the size, composition, and cohesion of 
online groups when they attempt to create an environment conducive 
to privacy protection. Tools should not be centered on individual 
rights of review and deletion, which have proven largely ineffective. 
Rather, tools should focus on group communication, sanction, and 
fostering a sense of repeat play and community. Even the way that we 
speak about the nature of the problem can have an impact on 
whether people cooperate to produce the public good of privacy. 
The highest aspiration of an academic article is not to settle a 
debate, but to spur further inquiry. We do not claim to have identified 
the best solutions from a legal policy perspective, and we believe that 
much fruitful behavioral-economic research is yet to come. We hope, 
however, that the door is now open, and that the overindividualized 
approach to privacy protection will yield to a more balanced debate 
about the tensions between individuals and groups in the privacy 
context. 
